School’s Out – What Chinese are talking about … (2)

The cult of Xi – from the Little Red Book on Mao Zedong thought to the nightly quiz show on Xi Jinping thought 

extolling Mao with the little red book; and 

extolling Xi with the tv quiz show 

Source: https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-china-blog-45728131   A nightly tv show features students vying to be the one who knows most about the life, speeches, and travels of the current dear leader and Marxism.  This is a game show,  but there are no prizes for winners.  That must be why tv ratings are so low. 

As you know, I have some acquaintances from the Chinese government, in several different provinces and in some state owned businesses and universities.  All have pretty good jobs, at mid-level or higher.  A few are moving beyond a middle mid-level, perhaps chu bu ji, to higher reaches ting bu ji, as party leaders in districts or counties or university departments. 

Over the last five years, many expressed concerns about the direction of current Chinese governance, in much the same way that Americans look askance at the machinations of the Republican party and the orange-haired baboon (hat tip to Brad DeLong for the descriptor).  A common theme in China is the return to the fears and terrors of the Cultural Revolution.  Most of my acquaintances were born in that era, and have stories from their parents and families and colleagues.  The disappearances, the arrests now for corruption on actions that until recently were standard operating procedure, the personality cult of Mr. Xi, the demands for ideological purity, the lack of procedural rules that makes accessories to crimes out of officials just doing what they are told to do, the double binds that crop up all too frequently – if I do this thing, it will be illegal;  if I don’t do this thing, my career will be over – all are chilling reminders.  I will detail some of these fears in a future post.

The new era affects CCP members in their most cherished place – their families and kids. 

Among the recent developments in the last couple of years is passport retention by the Discipline Inspection Bureau for all mid-levels.  Prior to about 2013, Chinese officials going abroad could use either of two passports – a government official passport, which was always held by the Human Resources Department of their workplace, or their own private passport, which individuals retained, as we would do in the US.  Now, even the private passports are being held by the Discipline Inspection Bureau jiwei for some midlevels and above in at least some places.  I am told this policy is active in Hubei Province; not sure where else as of October.  It was not in effect in Zhejiang in June.  And some of my acquaintances – more than a couple – are worried that they might be unable to get out of China in the future.  Travel to the US is much more restricted on the Chinese side, and this was the case before the US 2016 election.  Chinese with kids in college in the US no longer get automatic approval to go out to see their kid graduate, notwithstanding the further restrictions on students and their families from the American State Department.

So what to do?  This is not a matter of trying to get illegal gains out of China.  These concerns are being expressed by good public servants who wish to retain options for retirement or school choices for their kids. The government has made it more difficult to move money out of China.  For the past twenty years, that was the safety valve for wealthy families- buy the house in London or Sydney or New York or San Francisco or Vancouver or Seattle, let the wife and kids live there, and at some point, retirement or the need to get out, join them (the US has no extradition treaty with China).  In 2012, Lin Zhe, a professor from the CCP’s Central Party School and a member of the National People’s Congress, said that 1.18 million senior officials’ spouses and children had emigrated between 1995 and 2005.

There are still ways to get money out.  Now, getting the people out is becoming more risky on both ends.  It is reported that senior government officials (perhaps at the provincial vice minister level or higher) will no longer be able to send their children outside China for education. Secret order to bar students from going out  China Said to Issue Secret Order Barring Senior Officials’ Children From Studying in US   This article notes that –

At a Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing on July 24, Dan Blumenthal, director of Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), recommended that the U.S. government impose visa limitations on the children of the CCP elite as a means of economic pressure.

AEI is a fairly right wing organization, and in normal times there would be no reason to think that its recommendations about visa restrictions would be considered.  However, we are not in normal times.  Good thing that Xi Mingze was able to get out of Harvard by 2014.  Today, she might not have been able to go out, or to get in. 

One of the few known pictures of Xi Mingze from her time at Harvard.   Source: https://images.firstpost.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Xi-daughter-Twitter.jpg

Among many other worries, ability to go out for education is a worry for some smart and thoughtful Chinese officials and business people and academics.   Good thing Canada is still available. 

The International Student Office – Evaluation

This is the executive summary of a report prepared by students in my Modern Chinese Economic History course in spring 2014.

At that time, every Chinese university was competing to admit foreign students, mostly from Africa and the middle east.  University programs got put together on very short timeframes, with no training for staff and procedures more or less made up on the spot.  The pawns in this process were the foreign students themselves, who often arrived unprepared for college work, unfamiliar with China, lacking any Chinese language, their first time out of the home country, and certainly unprepared for Chinese university norms.   This work was an attempt to bring some efficacy, functionality (rather than efficiency) to the international student program.  Although this report is from 2014, there is no doubt that international programs in China still require upgrading to bring them to a minimal acceptable standard of responsiveness and care.

 Any student looking to attend school in China should read this, at least to get the jist of the boots-on-the-ground feel among foreign students.  This is not to say, do not attend school in China.  But forewarned is forearmed.   The full report is available by emailing me. 

 

An Evaluation of the Efficacy of the Administration of the International Student Program at Zhejiang University of Science and Technology

 

                     Prepared by

                     Students of

           Modern Chinese Economic History

        Zhejiang University of Science and Technology

 

 

                     Spring, 2014

 

              William D. Markle, Ph.D. Professor

 

Participating Students

茅晚菱 Mao Wan Ling

Bogdan Oprea

杜亚芳 Du Ya Fang

严丽文 Yan Li Wen

李亚男 Li Ya Nan

Nikodemus Hermanto

Lukas Cavalcante Baier

杨雪芳 Yang Xuefang

Mohammed Abdullah Mohammed Ali

Maingi Joy Nkatha

Dorothy Mutsamwira

沈洁妮Shen Jie Ni

阮芳波Ruan Fang Bo

陈雪Chen Xue

李丹Li Dan

Candy Shirly

Gladis Tshizainga Kasongo

Tariro Kurly Chingarande

章旭霞Zhang Xu Xia

顾盛霞Gu sheng Xia

吴越 Wu Yue

江添 Jiang Tian

Diana Madalina Nemes

Mary Assumpta Muhoza

Golden Chifune

Twagirayezu Didier

Sadick Mahdi Aden

Stefanie Bracher

Martina Odermatt

葛佳锋Ge Jia Feng

张晨凯Zhang Chen Kai

吴雯雯Wu Wen Wen

包舒影 Bao Shu Ying

 

An Evaluation of the Efficacy of the Administration of the International Student Program at Zhejiang University of Science and Technology

 

Executive Summary

 

Zhejiang University of Science and Technology (ZUST) has a long history of cooperation with foreign schools, particularly schools in Germany. While there have been many years of exchanges of faculty for research and lecture purposes, there were no foreign full-time degree candidate students at ZUST until the fall semester of 2009. This is considered the beginning of the ZUST international student program.

In the spring of 2014, there were 392 full time degree candidate foreign students at ZUST. In civil engineering, 167 foreign students; in the School of Economics and Management, in marketing, 47; in international economics and trade, 120; in the Language School, in business Chinese, 47; and a new major, information science, 11 students. First year students in the spring of 2014 numbered 142. There are additional exchange students, mostly from Germany, who stay at ZUST for varying lengths of time, from a few weeks to one year. (source: ZUST International Student Office, personal contact)

International programs are complex, perhaps more for university administration than for university academic faculty. Teachers need to address language barriers and perhaps cultural barriers in class; but administrators must deal with a far broader range of concerns, from admission standards, dorms and living conditions to food and health issues and visa and language and cultural difficulties. 

ZUST has now had an international student program for five years, with a second graduating class this June (2014). It is time to assess the quality of the international student program – is the program working as intended? Are students satisfied with outcomes? Are teachers satisfied with outcomes? What remains to be done to blend the international student program into the culture of a Chinese university? How effective is the program in creating customer satisfaction?

The fundamental goal of this research is to assist ZUST staff in making the International Student Office more effective in serving students, and thereby providing a better experience for foreign students. 

This evaluation addresses the administrative elements of the international student program. We reviewed student experience with health services, postal services, dorms and living conditions, and the international student offices, within the university and the individual department.Individual academic units within the School of Economics and Management and Civil Engineering should address academic quality. But students are the customers, in a real sense, of a Chinese university, and we want to ask whether their consumer needs are being met.

We conducted surveys and interviews of ZUST students, staff, and faculty. We document a wide range of concerns from students, less so from teachers and administrators. This is suggestive, in itself. 

We were also interested in how the ZUST international program compares with that at other schools. While we could not get substantial information due to time constraints, we did obtain good information about the experience of students and administrators. We interviewed students and administrators at two other schools, Zhejiang University and Zhejiang Gongye University (Zhejiang University of Technology).

Many students do not find significant problems in dealing with either the International Student Office in A4 or their department office. Problems that are identified by other students generally are about communications, in various forms.  

Conclusions are described in detail in Chapter 6.  Broadly speaking, we consider three fundamental areas requiring attention –

  • Quality and details in communications with foreign students verbally and in print, by email and text and online

There are difficulties in communication in both directions – Chinese staff to students, and students to Chinese staff. Additional training and techniques are necessary here, particularly for communications that involve student health and safety.

  • Timeliness and trust in communication

There are significant problems in lack of trust in communications from Chinese staff. The problems are attributable to communications that are too late for effective response, last minute requirements, communications that are wrong, and communications that are perceived by foreign students as simply lying. This harms both the administration of the program and academic quality.

  • Management of the International Student Office and department office functions – quality of management and policy direction

There does not appear to be any systematic training for international program staff. Nor can we see program goals, objectives, measures of performance, or an ongoing program of quality improvement.  As ZUST adds more foreign students, these defects will become even more apparent.  By accepting foreign students who are not qualified to be in the classroom, either due to English or preparation difficulties, the International Student Office defeats the purpose of having foreign students at all – to make Chinese students better.  The current model is a business model, not an academic model.

Particular recommendations are described in Chapter 6. 

Academic Integrity in the International Civil Engineering Program at Zhejiang University of Science and Technology

This is the executive summary of a group research project conducted by students in my Modern Chinese Economic History course in spring of 2014.


This work could only have been conducted under my direction – no Chinese faculty member would dare to investigate the rampant cheating in the civil engineering department.   In addition to the widespread academic dishonesty, the investigation found that there seems to be no civil engineering program in China – with the possible exception of a program at Tsinghua – that meets international accreditation standards – meaning that no graduate from a school in China will be eligible to take the PE exam for most countries without significant additional training or experience. 

The full report is available.  Contact me if interested.

An Evaluation of Academic Integrity in the International Civil Engineering Program at Zhejiang University of Science and Technology

 

Prepared by

Students of Modern Chinese Economic History    Zhejiang University of Science and Technology

  Spring, 2014

William D. Markle, Ph.D.  Professor

 

Participating Students

Salman Wasir     Tong Xiaixia     Dancan Siparo Ntirra     Carine Sonia Barutwanyo     Ali Mohamed Ahmed     Chadya Lys Everole Okola Aha

Mary Nyamvumba     Matshik Isabelle Mbako     Mahad Abdullahi Mire     Musabao Kahingania David     Wang Xiaoyan     Ren Zhoudi

Zhou Zhenhao     Shen Bijia     Wang Chenyang     Bogdan Oprea     Mao Wanling

 

An Evaluation of Academic Integrity in the International Civil Engineering Program at Zhejiang University of Science and Technology

Executive Summary

      Accreditation is the process by which a university program is accepted into the academic community.   Is an academic program doing teaching, and research, that is consistent with the quality standards in the field?   Can an academic civil engineering program produce engineers who know enough, have experience enough, are trustworthy enough, to be trusted with the lives, projects, and financial resources of their clients in the future?

      Governments in much of the world do not decide whether an academic program meets the requirements of knowledge transfer and academic integrity.  Accreditation is a peer evaluation of the quality of a program. 

      Academics from other schools and professionals in the field review the teaching, research, students, and outcomes of a program to judge its effectiveness, quality, and correspondence to standards in the academic and professional communities.    Academic programs judged to meet the standards of the academic and professional community are accredited, and are considered part of the academic community.  A program that is not accredited does not necessarily close down; a program might actually be quite successful, and of good quality.   But non-accreditation means that a program has not been admitted to the academic community of scholarship and research, as judged by peers – other scholars.

      In this evaluation, we are looking at the ZUST civil engineering program, with regard to only one element – academic integrity.  Integrity is an essential part of professional and academic life in engineering.  A student who cheats on an exam, when only a grade is at stake, might be expected to cheat on design of a bridge or a building when a lot of money is at stake.   Engineering as a profession does not want such people.

      While individual cases of university cheating and plagiarism would not normally affect accreditation of an engineering program – an individual student can be failed in courses, or expelled from school – the assumption in academic life is that no department or program would permit failures of academic integrity to become epidemic.   Widespread cheating, in one course or over time in several courses in a program, would be cause for immediate attention from departmental leaders, college deans, and university administrators, including the provost.   Accreditation programs would certainly investigate reported incidents of widespread academic dishonesty, whether reported by faculty, students, or outsiders.  If such information becomes widely known, it would affect the ability of the university to attract quality teachers, and affect the ability of students to get better jobs when they graduate.

The goal of this evaluation is to determine whether there is widespread violation of academic standards for honesty in the ZUST civil engineering program.    There have been allegations of widespread cheating on exams and tests.  Is that true?  What response from the civil engineering department faculty or administration?  If true, have students been expelled or punished?   Are violations of academic standards for honesty tolerated at other universities?   How do other schools address the problem?    The results of this evaluation will not produce an answer, “yes,” or  “no.”    We will get information on the experience of students and teachers at ZUST and at other schools, report on our findings, and let others decide what to do as the next step.

The survey and interview results suggest that academic dishonesty is found in a rampant manner within ZUST. The surveys collected and interviews taken from students and teachers across ZUST’s learning environment seem to point that cheating is a serious and dangerous problem for the system, a problem that the administration does not take seriously at the moment. The consequences of such behavior by the administration are leading to a poor quality learning environment and a cheaper degree, which puts students graduating from this program in a difficult stance. All the results and conclusions are based on the surveys and interviews collected in ZUST and in the similar universities as a mean of comparison. The results mainly provide the idea that the unwillingness to control cheating defeats attempts by the school’s administration desire, to upgrade ZUST, from a college (xue yuan) to a university (da xue) level, creating an incentive for students to minimize their efforts in the learning process and engage in being dishonest.

A meaningful interview came from one of the graduates of 2014 promotion. He was asked through an email, what is his perspective on academic dishonesty in ZUST, based on the citation: “A student who cheats on an exam, when only a grade is at stake, might be expected to cheat on design of a bridge or a building when a lot of money is at stake.   Engineering as a profession does not want such people.”

After four years within ZUST civil engineering program, his answers could not be more sincere: “The statement above is, in my opinion, arguably right. I have seen a lot of cases like this in my university life, for about four years. I will not lie to you, I have also cheated two or three times in my exam. I do not quite remember which courses they were, but one of them was finite elements taught by Wang Ji Min. I did that because I could not understand his course, as a whole, due to the difficulty of the course and because the teacher was not competent with his English. For the other courses, I studied hard and did just fine until I graduated few days ago.

What intrigued me was, in four years of university life, I always find students who cheats on every exam. They use their phone (mainly wechat) to take photos then shared the answers. I have never seen anything like this before, so I am quite surprised. 

Cheating in class, based on my experiences, is the faulty of both students and teacher, lets just say 70% faulty on students and 30% on teachers. Students come from all over the world, so they have varied learning background, because we all finished high school. However, I find that the quality of students enrolled in the university (mostly from African continent) is surprisingly below average. It is not because they are not capable, but because they are lazy. They did not put much effort to learn in the courses. I also found something strange with students that applied for a major in ZUST and skipped most of the class because they are working or some other reasons, only showed up 2 or 3 times in class, then attended final exam and PASSED the course. Of course, they copied all the answers from others. This is all I know about integrity problems in ZUST, and sometimes Chinese students also do it, academics dishonesty.”

The conclusion drawn from his interview can be stated with the following quote: “The civil engineering degree then becomes not the first step to a progressive career, but a limiting step.   The graduate is confined to lower level work, without professional engineer status, unless significant additional education or experience is obtained.” 

Performative Declamation

people talking without speaking …

note: I am reminded that this needs more than a little editing and a bit of shortening.  Ok.  You may skim rather than read.  And I am now reminded of how GOP apparatchiks fall into line when defending the latest from their current dear leader.  Another way in which the GOP has bought the Chinese export. 

At Gettysburg,  the featured speaker Edward Everett talked for two hours, and Lincoln for three minutes.  Some thought Lincoln’s remarks were foolish and inappropriate.  Chinese leaders never want to look foolish.  I have sat through the one and two hour speeches that might have been delivered  in ten minutes – if content were what mattered, rather than performance. 

Over the course of fifteen years, my Chinese government students asked many questions about American governance or politics or economic policy.  I occasionally wondered what happened when I began to explain details and found the attention of my Chinese questioners drifting off after only a moment’s discourse.  Was it just poor delivery on my part?  Maybe.  Maybe not.

A response draped in correlative thinking would sometimes have been better.   “Why do Americans have so many guns?”  “A man’s home is his castle.”     Less clear, no details, vague, but certainly – shorter and with some shred of correlation between guns and property rights.

Sometimes being shorter in public speaking is not enough.  In public speaking in China, one needs to obfuscate, and if one is a leader, one needs to speak at length as a show of authority and sophistication.  As in teaching in China, quantity is often a substitute for quality.

The joke about socialism – the only thing wrong with socialism is, too many meetings.  Americans in universities and business and government complain about too many meetings, and too long, and too disconnected.  But Americans are novices at meetings, compared with Chinese.   Americans would not meet at all for many of the things that Chinese faculty in universities spend two or three hours on.  A single phone call, perhaps a conference call, perhaps a momentary meeting in the hall.  Perhaps a decision by the dean, or a proposal with alternatives, a sort of survey.  In Chinese meetings, not always but often, every person at the meeting is expected to offer thoughts.  And those thoughts are still constrained by deference to leaders.   Chinese will sometimes refer to this as a form of democracy.  The spoken word results are what is called performative declamation.

It is of no matter to a speaker at a meeting, or people on the dais, that perhaps no one in the audience is paying attention.  Attendance may be mandatory; attention is not, when a single speaker can declaim for two or three hours.  I was surprised to find leaders, who are given great deference in other circumstances, speaking to a crowd that has their heads down, focused on cell phones.  But – performative is what counts.  Substance will be communicated via other means.   

One should immediately see the connections to use of political rhetoric in China.  Speaking carefully to leaders is another aspect of Chineseness that is thousands of years old.  The proper address, the proper kowtow, the proper words are more important than substance.

China has done an excellent job of adopting and adapting to western science and technology, and even to popular culture.  The most senior and highest ranking CCP members are as global in their outlooks – probably more so – than most US Congressman.   And yet, there remains one doppelganger, one elephant in the room, for the CCP in adapting to western ideas.  That is the fear of multiple definitions of the good in society – that CCP will be unable to continue its legitimate monopoly on what counts for the Good in society.  That way public dissension lies, civil society lies, multiple parties lie, and an end to the vanguard of the proletariat.  Most frightening for the CCP, there is the constant assault from the west of attitudes to multiple goods in society – that the government does not always know the best path, that government does not always have the truth.

Individual people know this, and they know that the government does not tolerate too much dissent.   Superficial disagreement about means and methods is fine; but disagreement with leaders about fundamental goals is dangerous in situations where the Party’s face, or prestige, is on the line.

There is not so much risk in university faculty meetings.  But disagreement with the leader is still considered inappropriate, unless couched in vague terms.  And there is pressure to follow the leader’s path.

In the US, we also understand “positive energy” in communications.  Corporations and governments in the US want employees to project a positive image, and speak well of the company or the department and its work.  “Tomorrow, we will do better – we will be better.”   The CCP takes the positive energy message quite seriously.  High school and university faculty and students are exhorted to use positive energy is speeches and writing.

One sees this in “performative declamation” 表态.  Katherine Morton, at the Australian National University, describes the performance among Chinese students at a summer program in Turin, Italy.  She was discussing the concept of the Chinese Dream, recently made popular by Xi Jinping –

Mainland Chinese participants, although of varied backgrounds and very different personal opinions (in private) felt that, after one of their number requested that she be given time to make a ‘personal’ statement on the subject of The China Dream, they all had to fall in line publicly and, hands raised, chorused a series of anodyne and vacuous declarations.  If nothing else, I remarked to the non-Mainland students present, they had an insight into the Communist-inculcated cultural practice of ‘performative declamation’ , a form of verbal posturing, an example of ‘group think’ aimed at presenting a united front in the face of independent thinking. It’s just this kind of knee-jerk solidarity that also vouchsafes the individual against the ever-present threat of being reported to the authorities back home.

Morton refers to this as the“Hall of the Unified Voice,”of the high Maoist era, in which each speaker declaims, for as long as thought expected, on the wisdom and wonderfulness of leaders and their plans.

Katherine Morton.  The Rights and Responsibilities of Disagreement.  The China Story, The Australian Centre on China in the World, September 21, 2014. Rights and Responsibilities of Disagreement

Ci Jiwei, author of Moral China in the Age of Reform, calls this form of speech surface optimism.

I call it surface optimism in the sense that it is not informed by an underlying quest for certainty as the hallmark of knowledge. As the trajectory of the Socratic tradition has repeatedly shown, the quest for certainty goes hand in hand with skepticism and has a uniquely powerful potential to lead to pessimistic conclusions about knowledge or at the very least to deflate overly confident claims regarding its possibility or scope.

Ci, Jiwei.  What is in the cloud? A critical engagement with Thomas Metzger on “The clash between Chinese and western political theories” Boundary 2, 2007, v. 34 n. 3, p. 61-86.  University of Hong Kong.  At  Ci Jiwei – What is in the Cloud?

Geremie Barme, editor at China Heritage Quarterly, at Australian National University, reminds us of “New China Newspeak,” a style of speaking and writing that is seen in official reports, speeches, and communications both within China and meant for foreign consumption.

The expression covers a wide range of prose and spoken forms of modern Chinese that have evolved and been consciously developed as the result of profound linguistic changes and experiments that date back to the late-Qing period, all of which are intimately connected with politics, ideas and the projection of power. Some of these styles reflect the militarization of Chinese in modern times (during the Republic, in Manchukuo, and under both the Nationalist and the Communist parties). Added to this is the stilted diction of bureaucratese (developed on the basis of traditional bureaucratic language), as well as scientific and academic jargon, to which have been added various forms of political and commercial exaggeration, euphemisms and neologisms. It mixes argot and the vernacular with the wooden language of Communist Party discourse. In recent decades this body of language practices has been ‘enriched’ by the verbiage of neoliberal economics and revived Cultural Revolution-era vituperation.

Geremie Barme.  New China Newspeak.  The China Story.  Australian Centre on China in the World.  August 2, 2012.  Geremie Barme – New China Newspeak

Examples are to be found in any speech or any writing delivered by any leader at any level.  Here is Jiang Shigong, eminent legal scholar at Peking University Law School, heaping praise on the “core leader, the core of the entire party,” Xi Jinping, on Xi’s speech at the 19th Party Congress in Otober, 2017 –

More important is the fact that Xi Jinping, at a particular moment in history, courageously took up the political responsibility of the historical mission, and in the face of an era of historical transformation of the entire world, demonstrated the capacity to construct the great theory facilitating China’s development path, as well as the capacity to control complicated domestic and international events, thus consolidating the hearts and minds of the entire Party and the people of the entire country, hence becoming the core leader praised by the entire Party, the entire army and the entire country, possessing a special ‘charismatic power’.

Gloria Davies. Post of Jiang Shigong,  Philosophy and History:  Interpreting the “Xi Jinping Era” through Xi’s Report to the Nineteenth National Congress of the CCP.  Translation by David Ownby.  Reading and Writing the China Dream.’ The China Story – Australian Centre on China in the World.  Posted May 11, 2018. First published in Guangzhou Journal, January, 2018.  Available at Interpreting Xi at the 19th Party Congress

This work by Jiang is considered good writing.  Jiang has no problem emphasizing that Xi, and the CCP, speak for all Chinese on all matters of … well, not faith and morals, as does the Pope, but all matters of political and moral and economic and historical and cultural significance to all Chinese people.  Nor does Jiang have any problem emphasizing how CCP delivered the Chinese people from centuries of oppression by the west, and will remain on guard against the evil influence of the west.

The dead hand of such writing can carry on for ten or twenty or thirty pages of single spaced, small font characters.  You can imagine how it sounds when you have to listen for an hour or two or three.

Parenthetically, there is no question but that much of this writing is backed by extensive and detailed research in Chinese and western sources when the speech is delivered by a sufficiently high level official.  Study is always a part of performative writing.  No doubt Mr. Jiang could carry on a discussion of the philosophy of  western or American law that would surprise some American legal scholars.

This stilted style is not unknown elsewhere, of course;  and George Orwell provided a model in 1948 so insightful that one sometimes wonders if some CCP communications are not trying to simply model Orwell.  Read Qiushi – the publication of the CCP Central Committee, Seeking Truth – if you want good examples. It is available in English at Qiushi – Seeking Truth.

Barme cites the term “socialist market economy” as a good example of newspeak.  The term is confusing in the west; but in China, it expresses the contradictions of economic realities now.  And, more important, it provides cover for whatever deviations from Marxism-Leninism the CCP wishes to undertake.  A term with no meaning can mean anything; or, more precisely, it can mean whatever the government wants, whenever it wants it.  CCP tells us that, as a Communist Party, it will decide the meaning of socialism.  Well, ok, fair enough. But that privilege should not apply to all words.  We have to remember Orwell in 1984 – War is Peace, Freedom is Slavery, Ignorance is Strength – that is the nature of what we are dealing with.

Qiushi (Seeking Truth).  Publication of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, online in English at http://english.qstheory.cn/

But this “Mao-speak” is not a new concept within China.  Barme notes that Confucius used particular individuals as character-models to either praise or censure political acts in moral terms in his comments on the state of Lu in the Spring and Autumn Annals.  Confucius particularly called out for criticism those individuals – we might call them sophists – who could argue any side of a position.  “Rectification of names” was about calling things by their proper name.

Barme’s comments on New China Newspeak remind us of Orwell, of course, in 1984 –

To know and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while telling carefully constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions which cancelled out, knowing them to be contradictory and believing in both of them, to use logic against logic, to repudiate morality while laying claim to it, to believe that democracy was impossible and that the Party was the guardian of democracy, to forget, whatever it was necessary to forget, then to draw it back into memory again at the moment when it was needed, and then promptly to forget it again, and above all, to apply the same process to the process itself—that was the ultimate subtlety; consciously to induce unconsciousness, and then, once again, to become unconscious of the act of hypnosis you had just performed. Even to understand the word ‘doublethink’ involved the use of doublethink.

George Orwell.  1984.  Signet Classic, 1961,  Book 1, Chapter 3, page 32.

Barme provides an example that reminds me of many private conversations with CCP members on politics or rights. One ends up quickly at a non sequiter – there is just nowhere to go short of an hour or two of discussion.  I think that is what is intended. Barme’s example is about Liu Xiaobo, who later won the Nobel Prize in Literature –

On 11 February 2010, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu 朝旭 declared that: ‘There are no dissidents in China.’ This was, as Agence France-Presse reported it, ‘just hours after a Beijing court upheld an 11-year jail term for one of the country’s top pro-democracy voices.’  The report went on to say that: ‘Ma made the comment in answer to a question about leading mainland dissident Liu Xiaobo, whose appeal of his conviction on subversion charges was denied early on Thursday. When asked to elaborate, Ma said: “In China, you can judge yourself whether such a group exists. But I believe this term is questionable in China.”

Shortly thereafter, the artist and cultural blogger Ai Weiwei observed of this risible statement via his Twitter feed that:

1. Dissidents are criminals
2. Only criminals have dissenting views
3. The distinction between criminals and non-criminals is whether they have dissenting views
4. If you think China has dissidents, you are a criminal
5. The reason [China] has no dissidents is because they are [in fact already] criminals
6. Does anyone have a dissenting view regarding my statement?

Geramie Barme.  Citing ‘There are no dissidents in China’, Agence France-Presse, 11 February 2010.   Barme – Ai Weiwei on No Dissidents in China

One of the benefits of performative declamation is that one retains relative anonymity in the crowd.  David Ze reminds us that in imperial China, one could not separate words from the person.  What a person said indicated his personality.  Depending on the Emperor, there was no trying out of ideas, or hypothetical suggestions.  It seems not so different, now.  David Ze –

This feature was distinct in imperial Chinese culture.  If a suggestion was not favoured by the emperor, it meant the suggester’s loyalty should be questioned. In Hanfeizi’s words, it was not important what a person knew, but what, when, and how he said or refused to say it.    

This feature…  (was)  maintained and developed in China long after writing and printing technologies were established. While many gifted men were jailed or killed for what they wrote and many literary works were lost because of the political persecution of their authors, these two features were substantially used for ideological control by the state in two ways. First, they were used as a strategy to eliminate political enemies and consolidate the centralized control of thought. Second, by propagating this mentality, the state mobilized the masses in its political campaigns against unorthodox views and the persons who held such views. When either the views or the persons were labelled “evil,” the masses would take their own initiative in resisting the “evil” influence by supervising and reporting the persons’ actions or by refusing to print, sell, and read their literature. 

David Ze. Walter Ong’s Paradigm and Chinese Literacy.  Canadian Journal of Communications, 20:4 (1995)   Available at  Ze – Walter Ong and Chinese Literacy

Lest one think this was only an imperial China concept, we have plenty of current examples.  Violations of the requirements of performative declamation – what we might call free speech – can garnering instant rebuke from Chinese students, as well as from the government directly.  One example, of many one can find.  In 2017, Yang Shuping, a Chinese student studying at the University of Maryland, delivered a valedictory speech that made the mistake of expressing admiration and warmth for her time in the US, and comparing the US favorably to the conditions back home in Yunnan. She was immediately set upon by some of her fellow Chinese students, and she earned a direct rebuke from the government as well.  Both Global Times and People’s Daily rebuked her expression of opinion.

See discussion at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shuping_Yang_commencement_speech_controversy

A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman (!) criticized Yang,  saying, “Every Chinese citizen should be responsible for his or her remarks.” Responsible to whom? One should remember that the verb “to criticize” has different connotations in English and Chinese. To criticize someone in Chinese has a moral and normative tone – not, “that’s not a good idea,” but “you must not do that.” One wonders what lack of positive energy Ms. Yang will experience from businesses in her job hunt in China.  Later, she did apologize to the Chinese people.  No doubt, all 1.4 billion people breathed a sign of relief.  But her violation will certainly be noted in her dang’an – her dossier that travels with her through life – for any employer to see.

Zhu Mei.  MOFA responds to Chinese student’s controversial speech praising US.  China Global Television Network (CGTN), 2017-05-24.  Available at  Ministry of Foreign Affairs responds to a student comment

This, of course, demonstrates the intense and intrusive behavior of Chinese foreign affairs departments, charged with fostering and sometimes enforcing politically correct speech among Chinese outside of China. Faced with isolation and being unemployable when she returned home, the girl felt forced to apologize to her classmates, the government, and presumably to the Chinese people, for ‘having hurt their feelings.’  The Chinese government departments charged with observing and guiding and monitoring speech of students outside China are sometimes referred to as the “Bureau of Overseas Chinese Affairs,” or “Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries” and are described as existing to keep overseas Chinese aware of what is happening in China, as if students were pining for information about Chinese baseball scores or what is on sale back home at the mall.  These bureaus are being given a lot of attention as of 2018, as Chinese in overseas universities are perceived as not just students but sometimes as agents of the government.   Quite a few of our Chinese government students in Chicago worked at such departments in Zhejiang or Liaoning provinces.  In the Yang Shuping case, the “university’s Chinese Students and Scholars Association asked other mainland students studying in the US to create videos supporting and introducing their home towns. Those who do are encouraged to use the tagline “I have different views from Shuping Yang. I am proud of China.””   The Chinese Students and Scholars Association is supported by the Chinese government, in the form of monetary grants from local consulates.

Read more: Yang Shuping, sensing a threat, apologizes

There are multiple instances of Chinese with permanent residency in the US being told by the Chinese government that their family in China – parents, siblings, grandparents – might be harmed unless information is provided to assist the government in China.  This despicable threat seems to apply mostly to Chinese wanted with regard to having smuggled money out of China, or Chinese with a sibling who knows too much about internal CCP operations.  Obviously, the Chinese consulates in the US would be the logical agents to follow up on Chinese in the US.  But the consulate can remain above the fray.  The Bureau of Overseas Chinese Affairs is the agency that takes on this responsibility.

Leaders, and others, take active notice of the quality and quantity of deference to superiors.  In 2017, there was much jockeying about who was going to be elevated to the Political Bureau Standing Committee (PSC), the group of seven most important Chinese leaders.  Xi Jinping was expected to be making most of the choices himself, or at least have an extremely strong vote in selections.  Journalists and politicians read or listened to speeches by likely candidates.  No one actually “runs” for this position – that was part of the Bo Xilai hubris.  Since Xi Jinping had been designated as the “core” of Chinese leadership, observers would count how many times Mr. Xi, or the core, were mentioned in speeches.  More references indicated more deference, and possibly more chance to be elevated.  Performance, indeed.

Confucius told us about artful speech, which he derided just as Aristotle derided sophists.    Consider the “rectification of names,” passage in Analects 13 –

Tsze-lu said, “The ruler of Wei has been waiting for you, in order with you to administer the government. What will you consider the first thing to be done?”

The Master replied, “What is necessary is to rectify names.” “So! indeed!” said Tsze-lu. “You are wide of the mark! Why must there be such rectification?”

Confucius, responding –

“If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success.

“When affairs cannot be carried on to success, proprieties and music do not flourish. When proprieties and music do not flourish, punishments will not be properly awarded. When punishments are not properly awarded, the people do not know how to move hand or foot.

“Therefore a superior man considers it necessary that the names he uses may be spoken appropriately, and also that what he speaks may be carried out appropriately. What the superior man requires is just that in his words there may be nothing incorrect.”

Confucius is citing the need to speak the truth.  But in the hands of the CCP, rectification of names means not speaking unless one is directed to speak, and then speaking as expected, not as one thinks.   This is the performance game  that Ci Jiwei described in the prior section.

Artistry with meaning is not a new concept.  Ci Jiwei says this artistry with meaning creates the “two faces” problem in China.

People live in two worlds, then, an internal and external world.  In the external world, people mimic theb truth and meanings provided to them, adherence to which is critical for continued employment and promotions if in government, state owned businesses, or academic world.   People go through motions of assent.   The internal world of belief and meaning is starved, however.   As Ci says, the result is a vacuum of belief and meaning.   

Ci Jiwei, Moral China in the Age of Reform, Cambridge University Press, 2015.

The “two worlds” apply to academic work, as well as politics. The French sinologist Henri Maspero, in a citation now lost, showed the gulf between Chinese and western historians in making sense of the past –

Where we look for facts, nothing but facts, a Chinese literatus looks for a rule of life, a moral.  Seen from this perspective, history is not about the past but about the present, it is not science but literature, it is not about true and false but about right and wrong. It is all about judgments.  And yes, it is history, not despite but because of all this: not an anemic and meaningless “realistic” reconstruction of the past but an interpretation of the past in terms of the present, intended to serve as a guide for the future.  

It is this Chinese search for the convenient fact, in fact, that fosters western uncertainty with regard to findings of Xia and Shang dynasty relics.  Certainty in archeology is generally rare.  Why are you so sure, other than convenience, that this site you are researching is a Xia Dynasty site?

Performative declamation is part of the manner in which Chinese government addresses foreign leaders and governments.  One should remember that zhongguo is considered the most civilized place on earth, the central country, the superior model.  All other countries are vassal states, whether they provide tribute or not, as was expected for two thousand years, from the Xiongnu on to Tibet and Mongolia and Laos and Nepal, at the end of the Qing.  China accepts homage when it works to the benefit of China, but considers itself under no obligation to respond in kind.   So the Chinese government has no qualms about instructing the barbarians, even now, in proper deference to China and the Chinese people.  This is performative declamation in foreign policy jargon.  Tianxia, all under heaven, is properly ruled by the emperor in Beijing, even in the 21st century.

Performative declamation is not only for external communication.  In the innumerable – and per CCP officials, seemingly endless – meetings to discuss elements of business, it is customary for every individual in the meeting to speak, to offer an opinion.  But how to know what opinion to offer?  Following the message of the leader is not unknown in American business meetings.  But what if the big leader in the room has not arrived yet, or does not speak first?  What to do?

Contrary to expectations, the big leader in the room in any meeting does not necessarily always speak first.   The big leader could speak first, and indicate what course of action he wants to follow.  Subordinates, all of whom get to speak as well, then know how to declaim.  The big leader may leave, if he has other commitments; but the subordinates all remain to perform.  All participants watch each other.  If the big leader in the room speaks last, it will usually be clear from his assistant what path he wishes to follow, so subordinates will be able to perform well in any case.  Lest you think I exaggerate on the requirement that subordinates exude praise and follow the leader, there is a  term for this behavior toward the leader – pai ma pi, which means, patting the horse’s ass.  Everyone in China knows this phrase.

Depending on the leader, some real discussion and disagreement may be permitted.   This permission may be simply the habit of that particular leader, or the subject matter may indicate that real opinions are sought.   But if the leader in the room is very powerful, then disagreement tends to disappear, as it might in meetings in the US.  Disagreement brings loss of face, even for a powerful leader.  Just as Hanfeizi said, if a proposal is not favored by the leader, then the suggester’s loyalty should be questioned. There is no such thing as loyal opposition or heeding the advice of the lone voice.

The constant sense of the need to struggle develops another form of anxiety in China, one that is seen in government, in the CCP, in business, in schools.  That is the need to perform, immediately, upon demand.   Urgency is a form of currency – ability to perform quickly for a particular leader is a show of respect, and gives face to that leader.

We understand urgency in the US – real deadlines and arbitrary demands by the boss.   American urgency is usually for the sake of the task, not for the face of the boss, and therein lies a difference.   China is different.

I was at dinner with three university colleagues, all PhDs at my school.   One of the three was the vice dean of the business school, and the other two were senior faculty in that school. After dinner, about 9:00 PM, after drinking – some, not too much – we were driving back to school. Question from the driver to each – should we drop you at home or at the office?  Answer – office, I must go back to finish important work. At night. After dinner. After drinks.

At the time, I was suitably impressed.  Now, some years later, I understand that answer as a sort of performative declamation, an “I work harder than you do” expression.  It was pointless – all three went home directly.

But the pressure to produce, to work harder than anyone else, indeed, to show off for the leader, is always present.  It gives high performance a whole new meaning.

Intimidation Knows No Boundaries

This direct threat to a New Zealand academic – her office and home invaded –  is part of the intimidation pattern – transition from hard power to soft power to sharp power.  CCP is always watching.  In this case, Anne Marie Brady has studied Chinese politics, and recently wrote a report describing Chinese government infiltration in New Zealand politics, education, and media.

So, another story of direct threat to an academic, this time in New Zealand, by person or persons unknown.  The unknown perps are generally understood to be a Chinese government-promoted foreign version of chengguan – the plainclothes thugs hired informally by Chinese local governments to maintain street order, help evict farmers, provide household imprisonment services, threaten dissidents, and occasionally beat up or murder government objects of disaffection.  In this case, Anne Marie Brady wrote a detailed research report, titled Magic Weapons, describing the means by which Beijing intends to (surreptitiously) influence domestic and foreign policy in foreign countries using the United Front vehicles.  From the Magic Weapons article –

After more than 30 years of this work, there are few overseas Chinese associations able to completely evade “guidance” — other than those affiliated with the religious group Falungong, Taiwan independence, pro-independence Tibetans and Uighurs, independent Chinese religious groups outside party-state controlled religions, and the democracy movement—and even these are subject to being infiltrated by informers and a target for united front work.

 As in the Cold War years, united front work not only serves foreign policy goals, but can sometimes be used as a cover for intelligence activities.

 The Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Public Security, PLA Joint Staff Headquarters’ Third Department, Xinhua News Service, the United Front Work Department, International Liaison Department, are the main, but not the only, PRC party-state agencies who recruit foreign, especially ethnic Chinese, agents for the purpose of collecting intelligence.

 In 2014, one former spy said that the Third Department had at least 200,000 agents abroad.

 Some Chinese community associations act as fronts for Chinese mafia who engage in illegal gambling; human trafficking; extortion; and money laundering. As a leaked 1997 report by Canada’s RCMP-SIS noted, these organizations also frequently have connections with China’s party-state intelligence organizations.

The crisis of 1989 resulted in the CCP government stepping up foreign persuasion efforts (外宣) aimed at the non-ethnic-Chinese public too. As they had done in the past, in this the Chinese government drew on the help of high level “friends of China” —foreign political figures such as the USA’s Henry Kissinger, to repair China’s relations with the USA and other Western democracies. In 1991 the State Council Information Office was set up to better promote China’s policies to the outside world. Reflecting the fact that it is both a party and a state body, its other Chinese-only nameplate is the Office of Foreign Propaganda, 外宣办. Soon after, China Central Television (CCTV) launched its first English language channel. China gradually expanded its external influence activities under CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin (1989-2002). While these activities failed to ameliorate negative global public opinion towards the Chinese government and its policies, efforts to promote a positive image of China’s economic policies had much more success.

John Burge, the notorious Chicago police commander who oversaw torture and intimidation in arrests, had nothing on the chengguan in the way of despicable behavior.

https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/can-chinas-hated-local-police-reform-their-image/277202/

Source:Bystanders surround a street vendor beaten by the chengguan, China’s municipal police force (Sohu/Fair Use) in Yueran Zhang. Can China’s Hated Local Police Reform Their Image?  Atlantic, June 25, 2013.

From the New Zealand Herald, quoted in the South China Morning Post (!) –

According to The New Zealand Herald, Brady said her office on campus was broken into in December, and her home burgled last week, with computers, phones and USB storage devices stolen while other obvious valuables were overlooked.

Brady said the latest burglary was preceded by an anonymous letter threatening “pushback” against opponents of Beijing’s interests, with the warning: “You are next.”

And the intimidation is not a new story.  China has always blocked entry to China of scholars and writers it found to speak or write too honestly.  Minxin Pei, Andrew Nathan, and Perry Link are examples.  And –

Intimidation of foreign journalists in China in 2011 (actually, rather a constant)  Intimidation

And – Kevin Carrico, who was monitored in both the US and in Australia  Inside Higher Ed – Monitoring and Scrutiny of Foreign Professors  This Inside Higher Ed story is worth reading.

And you all know of the threat to Cambridge University Press and other academic publishers regarding demands to censor journals.

Foreigners in China, of course, have always been subject to scrutiny and more.  In recent weeks, Christopher Balding (teaching at the Shenzhen Branch of Peking University graduate school of business) has left China  Balding Out   He writes, “China has reached a point where I do not feel safe being a professor and discussing even the economy, business, and financial markets.”   He was threatened in 2015, as was I, although his experience was more extreme than mine.  His office at school was broken into, his apartment also, and he was quite sure his phone was being tapped. 

On to this most recent story  in the New York Times –

Break-ins of Home and Office of New Zealand Academic

Fingers Point to China After Break-Ins Target New Zealand Professor

Ms. Brady’s recent paper, “Magic Weapons,” was published last September. It identified categories of political-influence activities by China in Western democracies, laid out what Ms. Brady said was the Chinese Communist Party’s blueprint for conducting such activities worldwide, and examined New Zealand as a case study of Chinese influence across most spheres of public life.

When Ms. Brady returned home on the day of the burglary, bed covers were rumpled and papers strewn about, but her husband’s laptop was left untouched. She said that it appeared to be a “psychological operation” and the latest in a series of incidents targeting her over her work. She said her computer’s hard drive had been tampered with when she was previously in China, and that Communist Party officials questioned people she spoke with there.

Before the February burglary, she said, she received a letter warning her she would be attacked …..

Do read the original paper,  Magic Weapons China’s Political Influence Activities Under Xi Jinping

This story is also reported by Bill Bishop today at Axios China

Note to Foreign Students, late 2014

Zhejiang University of Science and  Technology          Hangzhou 

Before you came to China, you were aware of censorship by the Chinese government.   You likely knew that Youtube,  Twitter,  Facebook, and some blog site hosts – blogspot, among others – were blocked by the Chinese government.    You understand that the CCP is so desperately afraid of the Chinese people that it cannot tolerate information from the outside – or inside – that is too “dangerous” to Party longevity.

In 2012, both the New York Times and any news sites operated by Bloomberg were blocked by the Chinese government, in retaliation for reporting on the fabulous family wealth of wen jiabao and xi jinping.    All of their sites are still blocked, including economic information and opinion from Paul Krugman, the Nobel prize winning economist.

In the last three months, we have entered a new phase of blocking unlike anything in the past ten years.    Google was intermittently blocked over the last two years, for their refusal to submit to censorship.   But that blocking applied only to the use of the search engine.

Now, gmail accounts are generally blocked – not always, and not all, but enough to make reliable communication impossible.   I have heard that other American email servers – Hotmail and  Yahoo – are at least occasionally blocked.   My AOL – America Online – service is not blocked, but extremely slow – can take hours for an email to go through.   The meaning of this is that, again, reliable communication is not possible.  You never know when your email is going to go through, and you don’t know if you are being sent emails that you do not get.   I can not have confidence that my students are getting emails I send with readings, ppt, and notes.

For teaching purposes, the blocking of web sites and servers is a bigger problem.    I need access to academic and professional articles, for both my own research and to give to you.  

Quite a few of my attempts to get articles in the last month have been blocked or are so slow –taking hours to load – that the effect is to stifle research.   

I have a workaround from a Chinese student, that seems to get Google access through Hong Kong, but this is also slow and not very reliable, and still fails to get access to many academic articles or sites.

It is now difficult for me to teach here.   I spend hours trying to send emails or get information, and that is just not acceptable.

The crackdown on communication is part of a current government strategy to accomplish several things – replace western communications suppliers – Apple, for example – with Chinese products (see, for example, Replace foreign products with Chinese)

and assist Chinese internet companies – Alibaba, Huawei, others – to become dominant providers inside and outside China, as well as protect the Chinese people from the deadly ideas coming from the west (America) that are designed to destroy China and the Party.   No joke.  These are ideas like freedom of speech, civil rights, and freedom of the press  (see “Document No. 9,”  Communist Party Central Office, spring 2013, if you can get it – Document No. 9 translation).

 I want you to understand that the blocking, like that of gmail, does not need to be perfect to do its job.   What is desired, more than the censorship itself, is to create a climate of uncertainty that encourages people to not bother looking, or to waste just enough time that they fail to accomplish what was intended.   Students give up trying to communicate.  Teachers give up trying to teach.   Researchers give up trying to understand.   Then, the Party is the only voice.

There have been temporary crackdowns on communications in the past.   You may expect very severe crackdowns in the month before June 4,  2015, as the Party tries to erase discussion of the June 4, 1989 murder of students by the army in Tian’anmen Square.

But this current crackdown is different.   This is not temporary.  It will last for several years, in my opinion, and will probably get worse.    You can get a Chinese email address to help communications, but you cannot get better access to web sites for information.   If you buy a VPN – virtual private network – then your access might be pretty good for some time, but the government has gotten pretty good at shutting those down as well, and you don’t know when your VPN will suddenly fail to work.

There is no reason to think that access will become easier in the next few years.   The government and Party have made it clear that internet access will be controlled more, and openness is not part of the strategy.    One can think of this as a policy of  “China for Chinese.   Foreigners go home.”

That is what I am suggesting that you consider, and advise friends back home who might be thinking of coming here next year and after.    China is a wonderfully interesting place, with lots to teach you.   But you need to consider the stupidity of the blocking in the calculation of whether you should study or work in China.

In the meantime, while you are here, I strongly urge you to not get angry about the blocking.    Authoritarian regimes understand anger and hate, and are not worried about that.

What authoritarian regimes everywhere do not understand, and cannot tolerate, is laughter.   I strongly urge you to laugh, loudly, consistently, and often, at the stupidity of a government so afraid of its own people that it cannot afford to let them see Youtube.

William D.  Markle, Professor

Some resources, if you can get them –

Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation.  China File.  http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation

Perry Link. Censoring the News Before It Happens. China File.  July 10, 2013   http://www.chinafile.com/censoring-news-it-happens

Zeng Jinyan.  This Family Nightmare Is The Price Of Political Expression In China – “Daddy’s ‘Friends’ Are Actually Plainclothes Cops” ChinaFile, September 23, 2014.  http://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/daddys-friends-are-actually-plainclothes-cops