Party’s Over

October 9, 2018 

The crackdown on expression hardens for CCP and anyone in government, even if not CCP 

Jiayun Feng, reporting in SupChina  jeremy@supchina.com – 

 New Party rules to govern members’ online behavior 

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is set to implement some new regulations for its members to monitor how they behave on the internet.

The new set of revised discipline rules was released by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection on September 26, and is set to take effect on October 1. Party members are required to be hyperconscious about what they post on digital platforms, such as the popular messaging app WeChat.

Chinese artist who posted funny image of President Xi Jinping facing five years in prison as authorities crackdown on dissent in the arts.  Independent, May 28, 2015

Source: The Independent – Chinese Artist Detained

These discipline rules are meant to be more stringent than anything coming out of the Party Central Office in the last four years.  But there is foreshadowing of these rules, as there often is in China.  In 2013, the infamous Document No. 9 specified seven rules for CCP members to observe, including forbidding any discussion of free speech, civil society, free press, and – notably, here – any negative comments about CCP or Party history (Mao, famine, Tian’anmen, et.al.)  From the Jiayun Feng piece –

According to the updated regulations, members could face expulsion from the Party if they make inappropriate remarks online. These include the endorsement of bourgeois liberalization, opposition to the Party’s policy of reform and opening up, groundless criticism of the Party’s major policies that will potentially undermine the organization’s unity, defamation of national heroes and models, and slander of the Party and state leaders. The invention or spreading of rumors regarding politics might also lead to various degrees of punishment.

My own sources suggest that the rules taking effect on October 1 will be implemented severely within universities.  In the run-up to the current rules, over the last couple of months, my contacts tell stories about a university Party leader who quit his job rather than be subject to speech discipline.  In another university instance, a faculty member who teaches comparative politics was left in a conundrum – she cannot say anything good about anything foreign.   When she objected, she was summarily removed from her teaching job and assigned to the library – a permanent demotion.  A PhD professor now stacks books, likely for the rest of her career.

Teachers are now observed, surreptitiously, either by provincial or central government jiwei, the discipline inspection bureau.  My students often recorded my lectures; now, that recording of Chinese teachers can be used against them in disciplinary proceedings.  In another despicable development, I have direct stories of person-to-person comments at an informal dinner, later leading to punishment.   Who do you trust?

For obvious reasons, I cannot name names in these articles, and I am reluctant to even name provinces, given the environment.  There was a time, back in the good old days prior to 2012, when one could conceive of the arc of history bending in the direction of greater openness in China.  In general, my CCP friends were happy about the direction of change.  No more.

In the past, personal exchanges on WeChat could include  comments on government policy, good and bad.  Now, those will be forbidden, under penalty of losing one’s job, expulsion from the Party, or at least “punishment,” which could include demotion or passover for promotion.   This assumes that the government can and will listen in on WeChat messages.

The crackdown is getting far more serious.  I told foreign students in 2014 to advise carefully potential future students, about whether they wanted to endure the petty disruptions and censorship that was China then.  (See the prior post here). Now, the disruptions and threats are at the point where some Chinese teachers, CCP members, would rather quit their jobs than be subject to the terror of the jiwei (discipline inspection bureau).  In the case of the comparative politics professor, the dean of her school and the party leader of her school were both disciplined for not controlling what she said in the classroom.

In the last year, I know of three separate incidents, two in Wuhan and one in Tianjin, in which university professors were fired (in one case, the professor reportedly kept his job after begging on his knees) for comments made in class that disturbed the local jiwei (discipline inspection) unit.  Either jiwei personnel or students with an axe to grind or guanxi to gain were listening in on the class.

Consider that these new rules are part and parcel of the social credit score, which has been discussed much in the last year.  If friends of yours make negative comments, not in your presence, that may reduce your own social credit score.   Who will want to collaborate with another faculty member who is impure in thought?

In related developments, the National Radio and Television Administration will now forbid any foreign tv shows to be broadcast in prime time, and foreign content will be limited to 30% of the time on streaming sites.  China limits foreign tv shows and streaming.

This reminds me – a liitle bit – of the level of terror in East Germany, or Stalin’s USSR, when family members informed on each other and friends informed on friends.  In China, this was last done in the Cultural Revolution.  Tellingly, many CCP members have been saying for years that the reign of Xi Jinping reminds them of nothing so much as it does the Cultural Revolution.  Of course, now, truly, no one could say that.

I am reminded of the Paul Simon line in Sounds of Silence – “people talking without speaking.”  Then, it was hearing without listening.  Now, it is what we call “performative declamation” rather than communication – speech acts as performance, without intent to communicate anything of meaning.  Those of you with CCP members in your wechat circle will now get only pablum as commentary.

All one need do to understand this system is read Orwell’s 1984, which describes official language perfectly.  CCP members are now caught in the doublethink trap.  For the most part, CCP members, particularly university teachers, are smart people.  But one must now say what is correct, rather than what one knows to be true –

To know and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while telling carefully constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions which cancelled out, knowing them to be contradictory and believing in both of them, to use logic against logic, to repudiate morality while laying claim to it, to believe that democracy was impossible and that the Party was the guardian of democracy, to forget, whatever it was necessary to forget, then to draw it back into memory again at the moment when it was needed, and then promptly to forget it again, and above all, to apply the same process to the process itself—that was the ultimate subtlety; consciously to induce unconsciousness, and then, once again, to become unconscious of the act of hypnosis you had just performed. Even to understand the word ‘doublethink’ involved the use of doublethink.

George Orwell.  1984.  Book 1, Chapter 3.

One’s speech must conform to the Truth as dictated.  And truthfully, it is not too difficult for even thoughtful and smart CCP members to spout the Party line. They learned the style of speech long ago, but its use was becoming limited until 2012.  Another name for this type of speech is New China Newspeak, a term popularized by renowned China scholar Geremie Barme. New China Newspeak describes a form of bureaucratic and political speech that uses history, scientific and technical jargon, vernacular references, economics, Chinese victimhood, and moral judgment to argue – seemingly interminably – for the Chinese government perspective as the only rational perspective.  New China Newspeak is not always long-winded, but it is repetitious.

See Geremie Barme.  New China Newspeak The China Story.  Australian Centre on China in the World.  August 2, 2012.

Katherine Morton provides an example in The Rights and Responsibilities of Disagreement (The China Story, September 21, 2014)    She refers to the “Hall of the Unified Voice” that she experienced while teaching a group of Chinese and foreign students in Turin, Italy, in 2013.  When one Chinese student ventured a comment on the Chinese Dream, each Chinese student then felt compelled to comment as well, with vacuous – and similar – statements that were a form of verbal posturing rather than attempt at introducing ideas or stimulating debate.  She describes –

an example of ‘group think’ aimed at presenting a united front in the face of independent thinking. It’s just this kind of knee-jerk solidarity that also vouchsafes the individual against the ever-present threat of being reported to the authorities back home.

The current crackdown on expression is part and parcel of this old historical style of speaking and writing.  Sophisticated speakers are good at this, but it takes practice.  One should begin learning with repetition – war is peace, freedom is slavery, ignorance is strength.

I have a longer essay on Performative Declamation  in the book section of the China Reflections blog.  It needs a little editing – right now, too much “performative declamation.”  But perhaps worth part of a look.

What Chinese are talking about (1) – Shaolin Temple raises the red flag

I hope this will become an occasional post, based on what I hear on the ground. 

Shaolin Monks, originators of Kung Fu, Kneel to Chinese Government 
Shaolin Buddhist monks, the world famous monks of astounding feats of athletic skill, concentration, and mind over body, originators of the martial art of kung fu, have indicated their subservience to the Chinese government in a ceremony held at their home temple in Dengfeng County in Henan Province.  This is a first in 1500 years, that the monks would indicate political subservience.

All photos: http://english.sina.com/china/s/2018-08-28/detail-ihifuvpi1509972.shtml

August 28, 2018 – Beijing: Shaolin Temple raises the red flag  by Kirsty Needham  (China correspondent for the Sydney Morning Herald)

Shaolin Temple, the birthplace of kung fu and famous home of the fighting monks, has raised the Chinese national flag for the first time in its 1500-year history.

A flag raising ceremony on Monday was attended by officials from the United Front Work Department, which oversees religious groups in China because of the Communist Party’s fear they may be a threat to its rule ….

The national flag would bring socialist core values into religious venues and “enhance national awareness” the temple said.    Shaolin temple raises the red flag

This is a surprising development for Chinese, who generally see Buddhism, and the Shaolin monks in particular, as sacrosanct.   Even in an era of crackdown on religion, on Tibetan Buddhism, this was unexpected, both for the brazenness of the demand from the United Front bureau and the willingness of the monks to acquiesce. 

From a South China Morning Post piece –

Red flag for Buddhists? Shaolin Temple ‘takes the lead’ in Chinese patriotism push

…  While the move was applauded by some, critics said it risked tainting religion with politics.

“As a Buddhist, this makes me feel uncomfortable,” one Weibo user wrote. “Before, I thought of religious faith as pure, but now it confuses me … With patriotism interfering with spiritual life, there is no space at all for individual thought. Is this what a harmonious society looks like?”

Another wrote: “The Buddha and Marx have shaken hands … Buddhism is meant to cultivate the mind, body and spirit – what has it got to do with politics? Haven’t the monks in the monastery renounced worldly living? I feel uncomfortable and just think that raising the national flag at the temple is simply not appropriate.”   SCMP – Red flag for Shaolin monksMonks and United Front officials watch the ceremony

The pressure on the Shaolin monks is likely related to two developments – first, the Shaolin monks have had their share of scandal, as they have become a global revenue generator from shows and demonstrations. The government will always take a strong interest in a historical cultural phenomenon that generates millions of dollars each year.  For more see Rise and fall of CEO monk.

Second, forcing the monks to raise the flag is a sign to all other religions in China, particularly Catholicism, that there is no greater force than CCP in the universe.  This has greater significance in light of the concurrent deal between the Vatican and the government to permit government involvement in selection of bishops in China.  This is anathema to many Chinese Catholics, in China and outside, but the Shaolin flag-raising emphasizes that CCP will brook no competitors for power.   (For more on the new era of crackdown on Christianity, see for example this South China Morning Post piece –   Christianity crackdown  (note – this link is now blocked or deleted) )

There is another aspect to the Shaolin development.  The Shaolin Buddhist monks do not owe allegiance to the Dalai Lama, but in the current environment in China, religious activities must be dealt with directly and forcefully.  The Dalai Lama does not cooperate, so pressure must be brought where it can.

There is ongoing fear in CCP that the current Dalai Lama, the spiritual head of Tibetan Buddhism, will not name an heir, a new Dalai Lama, making Beijing scramble to figure out who will be a leader they can control.  This is the nature of the deal made recently between the Vatican and the Chinese government – the Vatican will choose to approve bishops preselected by CCP.  Beijing has in fact demanded that the current Dalai Lama, in exile, name a successor, otherwise, CCP will do so for Buddhists.  Even CCP is reluctant to take this move – atheistic CCP appointing a new head of Tibetan Buddhism.  From a 2004 Time Magazine interview with the current Dalai Lama –

The institution of the Dalai Lama, and whether it should continue or not, is up to the Tibetan people. If they feel it is not relevant, then it will cease and there will be no 15th Dalai Lama. But if I die today I think they will want another Dalai Lama. The purpose of reincarnation is to fulfill the previous [incarnation’s] life task. My life is outside Tibet, therefore my reincarnation will logically be found outside. But then, the next question: Will the Chinese accept this or not? China will not accept. The Chinese government most probably will appoint another Dalai Lama, like it did with the Panchen Lama. Then there will be two Dalai Lamas: one, the Dalai Lama of the Tibetan heart, and one that is officially appointed.

Alex Perry. “A Conversation with the Dalai Lama”TimeOctober 18, 2004.

To further confound CCP, the Dalai Lama issued a statement in 2011 –

Bear in mind that, apart from the reincarnation recognized through such legitimate methods, no recognition or acceptance should be given to a candidate chosen for political ends by anyone, including those in the People’s Republic of China.  Retirement and Reincarnation Message

Checkmate, in advance.

 Short video about the flag raising ceremony –

 We have no king but Caesar?

The required Shaolin flag raising is, among other symbolic representations, a response to a Dalai Lama checkmate.  Hell hath no fury like a CCP scorned.

The International Student Office – Evaluation

This is the executive summary of a report prepared by students in my Modern Chinese Economic History course in spring 2014.

At that time, every Chinese university was competing to admit foreign students, mostly from Africa and the middle east.  University programs got put together on very short timeframes, with no training for staff and procedures more or less made up on the spot.  The pawns in this process were the foreign students themselves, who often arrived unprepared for college work, unfamiliar with China, lacking any Chinese language, their first time out of the home country, and certainly unprepared for Chinese university norms.   This work was an attempt to bring some efficacy, functionality (rather than efficiency) to the international student program.  Although this report is from 2014, there is no doubt that international programs in China still require upgrading to bring them to a minimal acceptable standard of responsiveness and care.

 Any student looking to attend school in China should read this, at least to get the jist of the boots-on-the-ground feel among foreign students.  This is not to say, do not attend school in China.  But forewarned is forearmed.   The full report is available by emailing me. 

 

An Evaluation of the Efficacy of the Administration of the International Student Program at Zhejiang University of Science and Technology

 

                     Prepared by

                     Students of

           Modern Chinese Economic History

        Zhejiang University of Science and Technology

 

 

                     Spring, 2014

 

              William D. Markle, Ph.D. Professor

 

Participating Students

茅晚菱 Mao Wan Ling

Bogdan Oprea

杜亚芳 Du Ya Fang

严丽文 Yan Li Wen

李亚男 Li Ya Nan

Nikodemus Hermanto

Lukas Cavalcante Baier

杨雪芳 Yang Xuefang

Mohammed Abdullah Mohammed Ali

Maingi Joy Nkatha

Dorothy Mutsamwira

沈洁妮Shen Jie Ni

阮芳波Ruan Fang Bo

陈雪Chen Xue

李丹Li Dan

Candy Shirly

Gladis Tshizainga Kasongo

Tariro Kurly Chingarande

章旭霞Zhang Xu Xia

顾盛霞Gu sheng Xia

吴越 Wu Yue

江添 Jiang Tian

Diana Madalina Nemes

Mary Assumpta Muhoza

Golden Chifune

Twagirayezu Didier

Sadick Mahdi Aden

Stefanie Bracher

Martina Odermatt

葛佳锋Ge Jia Feng

张晨凯Zhang Chen Kai

吴雯雯Wu Wen Wen

包舒影 Bao Shu Ying

 

An Evaluation of the Efficacy of the Administration of the International Student Program at Zhejiang University of Science and Technology

 

Executive Summary

 

Zhejiang University of Science and Technology (ZUST) has a long history of cooperation with foreign schools, particularly schools in Germany. While there have been many years of exchanges of faculty for research and lecture purposes, there were no foreign full-time degree candidate students at ZUST until the fall semester of 2009. This is considered the beginning of the ZUST international student program.

In the spring of 2014, there were 392 full time degree candidate foreign students at ZUST. In civil engineering, 167 foreign students; in the School of Economics and Management, in marketing, 47; in international economics and trade, 120; in the Language School, in business Chinese, 47; and a new major, information science, 11 students. First year students in the spring of 2014 numbered 142. There are additional exchange students, mostly from Germany, who stay at ZUST for varying lengths of time, from a few weeks to one year. (source: ZUST International Student Office, personal contact)

International programs are complex, perhaps more for university administration than for university academic faculty. Teachers need to address language barriers and perhaps cultural barriers in class; but administrators must deal with a far broader range of concerns, from admission standards, dorms and living conditions to food and health issues and visa and language and cultural difficulties. 

ZUST has now had an international student program for five years, with a second graduating class this June (2014). It is time to assess the quality of the international student program – is the program working as intended? Are students satisfied with outcomes? Are teachers satisfied with outcomes? What remains to be done to blend the international student program into the culture of a Chinese university? How effective is the program in creating customer satisfaction?

The fundamental goal of this research is to assist ZUST staff in making the International Student Office more effective in serving students, and thereby providing a better experience for foreign students. 

This evaluation addresses the administrative elements of the international student program. We reviewed student experience with health services, postal services, dorms and living conditions, and the international student offices, within the university and the individual department.Individual academic units within the School of Economics and Management and Civil Engineering should address academic quality. But students are the customers, in a real sense, of a Chinese university, and we want to ask whether their consumer needs are being met.

We conducted surveys and interviews of ZUST students, staff, and faculty. We document a wide range of concerns from students, less so from teachers and administrators. This is suggestive, in itself. 

We were also interested in how the ZUST international program compares with that at other schools. While we could not get substantial information due to time constraints, we did obtain good information about the experience of students and administrators. We interviewed students and administrators at two other schools, Zhejiang University and Zhejiang Gongye University (Zhejiang University of Technology).

Many students do not find significant problems in dealing with either the International Student Office in A4 or their department office. Problems that are identified by other students generally are about communications, in various forms.  

Conclusions are described in detail in Chapter 6.  Broadly speaking, we consider three fundamental areas requiring attention –

  • Quality and details in communications with foreign students verbally and in print, by email and text and online

There are difficulties in communication in both directions – Chinese staff to students, and students to Chinese staff. Additional training and techniques are necessary here, particularly for communications that involve student health and safety.

  • Timeliness and trust in communication

There are significant problems in lack of trust in communications from Chinese staff. The problems are attributable to communications that are too late for effective response, last minute requirements, communications that are wrong, and communications that are perceived by foreign students as simply lying. This harms both the administration of the program and academic quality.

  • Management of the International Student Office and department office functions – quality of management and policy direction

There does not appear to be any systematic training for international program staff. Nor can we see program goals, objectives, measures of performance, or an ongoing program of quality improvement.  As ZUST adds more foreign students, these defects will become even more apparent.  By accepting foreign students who are not qualified to be in the classroom, either due to English or preparation difficulties, the International Student Office defeats the purpose of having foreign students at all – to make Chinese students better.  The current model is a business model, not an academic model.

Particular recommendations are described in Chapter 6. 

Performative Declamation

people talking without speaking …

note: I am reminded that this needs more than a little editing and a bit of shortening.  Ok.  You may skim rather than read.  And I am now reminded of how GOP apparatchiks fall into line when defending the latest from their current dear leader.  Another way in which the GOP has bought the Chinese export. 

At Gettysburg,  the featured speaker Edward Everett talked for two hours, and Lincoln for three minutes.  Some thought Lincoln’s remarks were foolish and inappropriate.  Chinese leaders never want to look foolish.  I have sat through the one and two hour speeches that might have been delivered  in ten minutes – if content were what mattered, rather than performance. 

Over the course of fifteen years, my Chinese government students asked many questions about American governance or politics or economic policy.  I occasionally wondered what happened when I began to explain details and found the attention of my Chinese questioners drifting off after only a moment’s discourse.  Was it just poor delivery on my part?  Maybe.  Maybe not.

A response draped in correlative thinking would sometimes have been better.   “Why do Americans have so many guns?”  “A man’s home is his castle.”     Less clear, no details, vague, but certainly – shorter and with some shred of correlation between guns and property rights.

Sometimes being shorter in public speaking is not enough.  In public speaking in China, one needs to obfuscate, and if one is a leader, one needs to speak at length as a show of authority and sophistication.  As in teaching in China, quantity is often a substitute for quality.

The joke about socialism – the only thing wrong with socialism is, too many meetings.  Americans in universities and business and government complain about too many meetings, and too long, and too disconnected.  But Americans are novices at meetings, compared with Chinese.   Americans would not meet at all for many of the things that Chinese faculty in universities spend two or three hours on.  A single phone call, perhaps a conference call, perhaps a momentary meeting in the hall.  Perhaps a decision by the dean, or a proposal with alternatives, a sort of survey.  In Chinese meetings, not always but often, every person at the meeting is expected to offer thoughts.  And those thoughts are still constrained by deference to leaders.   Chinese will sometimes refer to this as a form of democracy.  The spoken word results are what is called performative declamation.

It is of no matter to a speaker at a meeting, or people on the dais, that perhaps no one in the audience is paying attention.  Attendance may be mandatory; attention is not, when a single speaker can declaim for two or three hours.  I was surprised to find leaders, who are given great deference in other circumstances, speaking to a crowd that has their heads down, focused on cell phones.  But – performative is what counts.  Substance will be communicated via other means.   

One should immediately see the connections to use of political rhetoric in China.  Speaking carefully to leaders is another aspect of Chineseness that is thousands of years old.  The proper address, the proper kowtow, the proper words are more important than substance.

China has done an excellent job of adopting and adapting to western science and technology, and even to popular culture.  The most senior and highest ranking CCP members are as global in their outlooks – probably more so – than most US Congressman.   And yet, there remains one doppelganger, one elephant in the room, for the CCP in adapting to western ideas.  That is the fear of multiple definitions of the good in society – that CCP will be unable to continue its legitimate monopoly on what counts for the Good in society.  That way public dissension lies, civil society lies, multiple parties lie, and an end to the vanguard of the proletariat.  Most frightening for the CCP, there is the constant assault from the west of attitudes to multiple goods in society – that the government does not always know the best path, that government does not always have the truth.

Individual people know this, and they know that the government does not tolerate too much dissent.   Superficial disagreement about means and methods is fine; but disagreement with leaders about fundamental goals is dangerous in situations where the Party’s face, or prestige, is on the line.

There is not so much risk in university faculty meetings.  But disagreement with the leader is still considered inappropriate, unless couched in vague terms.  And there is pressure to follow the leader’s path.

In the US, we also understand “positive energy” in communications.  Corporations and governments in the US want employees to project a positive image, and speak well of the company or the department and its work.  “Tomorrow, we will do better – we will be better.”   The CCP takes the positive energy message quite seriously.  High school and university faculty and students are exhorted to use positive energy is speeches and writing.

One sees this in “performative declamation” 表态.  Katherine Morton, at the Australian National University, describes the performance among Chinese students at a summer program in Turin, Italy.  She was discussing the concept of the Chinese Dream, recently made popular by Xi Jinping –

Mainland Chinese participants, although of varied backgrounds and very different personal opinions (in private) felt that, after one of their number requested that she be given time to make a ‘personal’ statement on the subject of The China Dream, they all had to fall in line publicly and, hands raised, chorused a series of anodyne and vacuous declarations.  If nothing else, I remarked to the non-Mainland students present, they had an insight into the Communist-inculcated cultural practice of ‘performative declamation’ , a form of verbal posturing, an example of ‘group think’ aimed at presenting a united front in the face of independent thinking. It’s just this kind of knee-jerk solidarity that also vouchsafes the individual against the ever-present threat of being reported to the authorities back home.

Morton refers to this as the“Hall of the Unified Voice,”of the high Maoist era, in which each speaker declaims, for as long as thought expected, on the wisdom and wonderfulness of leaders and their plans.

Katherine Morton.  The Rights and Responsibilities of Disagreement.  The China Story, The Australian Centre on China in the World, September 21, 2014. Rights and Responsibilities of Disagreement

Ci Jiwei, author of Moral China in the Age of Reform, calls this form of speech surface optimism.

I call it surface optimism in the sense that it is not informed by an underlying quest for certainty as the hallmark of knowledge. As the trajectory of the Socratic tradition has repeatedly shown, the quest for certainty goes hand in hand with skepticism and has a uniquely powerful potential to lead to pessimistic conclusions about knowledge or at the very least to deflate overly confident claims regarding its possibility or scope.

Ci, Jiwei.  What is in the cloud? A critical engagement with Thomas Metzger on “The clash between Chinese and western political theories” Boundary 2, 2007, v. 34 n. 3, p. 61-86.  University of Hong Kong.  At  Ci Jiwei – What is in the Cloud?

Geremie Barme, editor at China Heritage Quarterly, at Australian National University, reminds us of “New China Newspeak,” a style of speaking and writing that is seen in official reports, speeches, and communications both within China and meant for foreign consumption.

The expression covers a wide range of prose and spoken forms of modern Chinese that have evolved and been consciously developed as the result of profound linguistic changes and experiments that date back to the late-Qing period, all of which are intimately connected with politics, ideas and the projection of power. Some of these styles reflect the militarization of Chinese in modern times (during the Republic, in Manchukuo, and under both the Nationalist and the Communist parties). Added to this is the stilted diction of bureaucratese (developed on the basis of traditional bureaucratic language), as well as scientific and academic jargon, to which have been added various forms of political and commercial exaggeration, euphemisms and neologisms. It mixes argot and the vernacular with the wooden language of Communist Party discourse. In recent decades this body of language practices has been ‘enriched’ by the verbiage of neoliberal economics and revived Cultural Revolution-era vituperation.

Geremie Barme.  New China Newspeak.  The China Story.  Australian Centre on China in the World.  August 2, 2012.  Geremie Barme – New China Newspeak

Examples are to be found in any speech or any writing delivered by any leader at any level.  Here is Jiang Shigong, eminent legal scholar at Peking University Law School, heaping praise on the “core leader, the core of the entire party,” Xi Jinping, on Xi’s speech at the 19th Party Congress in Otober, 2017 –

More important is the fact that Xi Jinping, at a particular moment in history, courageously took up the political responsibility of the historical mission, and in the face of an era of historical transformation of the entire world, demonstrated the capacity to construct the great theory facilitating China’s development path, as well as the capacity to control complicated domestic and international events, thus consolidating the hearts and minds of the entire Party and the people of the entire country, hence becoming the core leader praised by the entire Party, the entire army and the entire country, possessing a special ‘charismatic power’.

Gloria Davies. Post of Jiang Shigong,  Philosophy and History:  Interpreting the “Xi Jinping Era” through Xi’s Report to the Nineteenth National Congress of the CCP.  Translation by David Ownby.  Reading and Writing the China Dream.’ The China Story – Australian Centre on China in the World.  Posted May 11, 2018. First published in Guangzhou Journal, January, 2018.  Available at Interpreting Xi at the 19th Party Congress

This work by Jiang is considered good writing.  Jiang has no problem emphasizing that Xi, and the CCP, speak for all Chinese on all matters of … well, not faith and morals, as does the Pope, but all matters of political and moral and economic and historical and cultural significance to all Chinese people.  Nor does Jiang have any problem emphasizing how CCP delivered the Chinese people from centuries of oppression by the west, and will remain on guard against the evil influence of the west.

The dead hand of such writing can carry on for ten or twenty or thirty pages of single spaced, small font characters.  You can imagine how it sounds when you have to listen for an hour or two or three.

Parenthetically, there is no question but that much of this writing is backed by extensive and detailed research in Chinese and western sources when the speech is delivered by a sufficiently high level official.  Study is always a part of performative writing.  No doubt Mr. Jiang could carry on a discussion of the philosophy of  western or American law that would surprise some American legal scholars.

This stilted style is not unknown elsewhere, of course;  and George Orwell provided a model in 1948 so insightful that one sometimes wonders if some CCP communications are not trying to simply model Orwell.  Read Qiushi – the publication of the CCP Central Committee, Seeking Truth – if you want good examples. It is available in English at Qiushi – Seeking Truth.

Barme cites the term “socialist market economy” as a good example of newspeak.  The term is confusing in the west; but in China, it expresses the contradictions of economic realities now.  And, more important, it provides cover for whatever deviations from Marxism-Leninism the CCP wishes to undertake.  A term with no meaning can mean anything; or, more precisely, it can mean whatever the government wants, whenever it wants it.  CCP tells us that, as a Communist Party, it will decide the meaning of socialism.  Well, ok, fair enough. But that privilege should not apply to all words.  We have to remember Orwell in 1984 – War is Peace, Freedom is Slavery, Ignorance is Strength – that is the nature of what we are dealing with.

Qiushi (Seeking Truth).  Publication of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, online in English at http://english.qstheory.cn/

But this “Mao-speak” is not a new concept within China.  Barme notes that Confucius used particular individuals as character-models to either praise or censure political acts in moral terms in his comments on the state of Lu in the Spring and Autumn Annals.  Confucius particularly called out for criticism those individuals – we might call them sophists – who could argue any side of a position.  “Rectification of names” was about calling things by their proper name.

Barme’s comments on New China Newspeak remind us of Orwell, of course, in 1984 –

To know and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while telling carefully constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions which cancelled out, knowing them to be contradictory and believing in both of them, to use logic against logic, to repudiate morality while laying claim to it, to believe that democracy was impossible and that the Party was the guardian of democracy, to forget, whatever it was necessary to forget, then to draw it back into memory again at the moment when it was needed, and then promptly to forget it again, and above all, to apply the same process to the process itself—that was the ultimate subtlety; consciously to induce unconsciousness, and then, once again, to become unconscious of the act of hypnosis you had just performed. Even to understand the word ‘doublethink’ involved the use of doublethink.

George Orwell.  1984.  Signet Classic, 1961,  Book 1, Chapter 3, page 32.

Barme provides an example that reminds me of many private conversations with CCP members on politics or rights. One ends up quickly at a non sequiter – there is just nowhere to go short of an hour or two of discussion.  I think that is what is intended. Barme’s example is about Liu Xiaobo, who later won the Nobel Prize in Literature –

On 11 February 2010, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu 朝旭 declared that: ‘There are no dissidents in China.’ This was, as Agence France-Presse reported it, ‘just hours after a Beijing court upheld an 11-year jail term for one of the country’s top pro-democracy voices.’  The report went on to say that: ‘Ma made the comment in answer to a question about leading mainland dissident Liu Xiaobo, whose appeal of his conviction on subversion charges was denied early on Thursday. When asked to elaborate, Ma said: “In China, you can judge yourself whether such a group exists. But I believe this term is questionable in China.”

Shortly thereafter, the artist and cultural blogger Ai Weiwei observed of this risible statement via his Twitter feed that:

1. Dissidents are criminals
2. Only criminals have dissenting views
3. The distinction between criminals and non-criminals is whether they have dissenting views
4. If you think China has dissidents, you are a criminal
5. The reason [China] has no dissidents is because they are [in fact already] criminals
6. Does anyone have a dissenting view regarding my statement?

Geramie Barme.  Citing ‘There are no dissidents in China’, Agence France-Presse, 11 February 2010.   Barme – Ai Weiwei on No Dissidents in China

One of the benefits of performative declamation is that one retains relative anonymity in the crowd.  David Ze reminds us that in imperial China, one could not separate words from the person.  What a person said indicated his personality.  Depending on the Emperor, there was no trying out of ideas, or hypothetical suggestions.  It seems not so different, now.  David Ze –

This feature was distinct in imperial Chinese culture.  If a suggestion was not favoured by the emperor, it meant the suggester’s loyalty should be questioned. In Hanfeizi’s words, it was not important what a person knew, but what, when, and how he said or refused to say it.    

This feature…  (was)  maintained and developed in China long after writing and printing technologies were established. While many gifted men were jailed or killed for what they wrote and many literary works were lost because of the political persecution of their authors, these two features were substantially used for ideological control by the state in two ways. First, they were used as a strategy to eliminate political enemies and consolidate the centralized control of thought. Second, by propagating this mentality, the state mobilized the masses in its political campaigns against unorthodox views and the persons who held such views. When either the views or the persons were labelled “evil,” the masses would take their own initiative in resisting the “evil” influence by supervising and reporting the persons’ actions or by refusing to print, sell, and read their literature. 

David Ze. Walter Ong’s Paradigm and Chinese Literacy.  Canadian Journal of Communications, 20:4 (1995)   Available at  Ze – Walter Ong and Chinese Literacy

Lest one think this was only an imperial China concept, we have plenty of current examples.  Violations of the requirements of performative declamation – what we might call free speech – can garnering instant rebuke from Chinese students, as well as from the government directly.  One example, of many one can find.  In 2017, Yang Shuping, a Chinese student studying at the University of Maryland, delivered a valedictory speech that made the mistake of expressing admiration and warmth for her time in the US, and comparing the US favorably to the conditions back home in Yunnan. She was immediately set upon by some of her fellow Chinese students, and she earned a direct rebuke from the government as well.  Both Global Times and People’s Daily rebuked her expression of opinion.

See discussion at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shuping_Yang_commencement_speech_controversy

A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman (!) criticized Yang,  saying, “Every Chinese citizen should be responsible for his or her remarks.” Responsible to whom? One should remember that the verb “to criticize” has different connotations in English and Chinese. To criticize someone in Chinese has a moral and normative tone – not, “that’s not a good idea,” but “you must not do that.” One wonders what lack of positive energy Ms. Yang will experience from businesses in her job hunt in China.  Later, she did apologize to the Chinese people.  No doubt, all 1.4 billion people breathed a sign of relief.  But her violation will certainly be noted in her dang’an – her dossier that travels with her through life – for any employer to see.

Zhu Mei.  MOFA responds to Chinese student’s controversial speech praising US.  China Global Television Network (CGTN), 2017-05-24.  Available at  Ministry of Foreign Affairs responds to a student comment

This, of course, demonstrates the intense and intrusive behavior of Chinese foreign affairs departments, charged with fostering and sometimes enforcing politically correct speech among Chinese outside of China. Faced with isolation and being unemployable when she returned home, the girl felt forced to apologize to her classmates, the government, and presumably to the Chinese people, for ‘having hurt their feelings.’  The Chinese government departments charged with observing and guiding and monitoring speech of students outside China are sometimes referred to as the “Bureau of Overseas Chinese Affairs,” or “Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries” and are described as existing to keep overseas Chinese aware of what is happening in China, as if students were pining for information about Chinese baseball scores or what is on sale back home at the mall.  These bureaus are being given a lot of attention as of 2018, as Chinese in overseas universities are perceived as not just students but sometimes as agents of the government.   Quite a few of our Chinese government students in Chicago worked at such departments in Zhejiang or Liaoning provinces.  In the Yang Shuping case, the “university’s Chinese Students and Scholars Association asked other mainland students studying in the US to create videos supporting and introducing their home towns. Those who do are encouraged to use the tagline “I have different views from Shuping Yang. I am proud of China.””   The Chinese Students and Scholars Association is supported by the Chinese government, in the form of monetary grants from local consulates.

Read more: Yang Shuping, sensing a threat, apologizes

There are multiple instances of Chinese with permanent residency in the US being told by the Chinese government that their family in China – parents, siblings, grandparents – might be harmed unless information is provided to assist the government in China.  This despicable threat seems to apply mostly to Chinese wanted with regard to having smuggled money out of China, or Chinese with a sibling who knows too much about internal CCP operations.  Obviously, the Chinese consulates in the US would be the logical agents to follow up on Chinese in the US.  But the consulate can remain above the fray.  The Bureau of Overseas Chinese Affairs is the agency that takes on this responsibility.

Leaders, and others, take active notice of the quality and quantity of deference to superiors.  In 2017, there was much jockeying about who was going to be elevated to the Political Bureau Standing Committee (PSC), the group of seven most important Chinese leaders.  Xi Jinping was expected to be making most of the choices himself, or at least have an extremely strong vote in selections.  Journalists and politicians read or listened to speeches by likely candidates.  No one actually “runs” for this position – that was part of the Bo Xilai hubris.  Since Xi Jinping had been designated as the “core” of Chinese leadership, observers would count how many times Mr. Xi, or the core, were mentioned in speeches.  More references indicated more deference, and possibly more chance to be elevated.  Performance, indeed.

Confucius told us about artful speech, which he derided just as Aristotle derided sophists.    Consider the “rectification of names,” passage in Analects 13 –

Tsze-lu said, “The ruler of Wei has been waiting for you, in order with you to administer the government. What will you consider the first thing to be done?”

The Master replied, “What is necessary is to rectify names.” “So! indeed!” said Tsze-lu. “You are wide of the mark! Why must there be such rectification?”

Confucius, responding –

“If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success.

“When affairs cannot be carried on to success, proprieties and music do not flourish. When proprieties and music do not flourish, punishments will not be properly awarded. When punishments are not properly awarded, the people do not know how to move hand or foot.

“Therefore a superior man considers it necessary that the names he uses may be spoken appropriately, and also that what he speaks may be carried out appropriately. What the superior man requires is just that in his words there may be nothing incorrect.”

Confucius is citing the need to speak the truth.  But in the hands of the CCP, rectification of names means not speaking unless one is directed to speak, and then speaking as expected, not as one thinks.   This is the performance game  that Ci Jiwei described in the prior section.

Artistry with meaning is not a new concept.  Ci Jiwei says this artistry with meaning creates the “two faces” problem in China.

People live in two worlds, then, an internal and external world.  In the external world, people mimic theb truth and meanings provided to them, adherence to which is critical for continued employment and promotions if in government, state owned businesses, or academic world.   People go through motions of assent.   The internal world of belief and meaning is starved, however.   As Ci says, the result is a vacuum of belief and meaning.   

Ci Jiwei, Moral China in the Age of Reform, Cambridge University Press, 2015.

The “two worlds” apply to academic work, as well as politics. The French sinologist Henri Maspero, in a citation now lost, showed the gulf between Chinese and western historians in making sense of the past –

Where we look for facts, nothing but facts, a Chinese literatus looks for a rule of life, a moral.  Seen from this perspective, history is not about the past but about the present, it is not science but literature, it is not about true and false but about right and wrong. It is all about judgments.  And yes, it is history, not despite but because of all this: not an anemic and meaningless “realistic” reconstruction of the past but an interpretation of the past in terms of the present, intended to serve as a guide for the future.  

It is this Chinese search for the convenient fact, in fact, that fosters western uncertainty with regard to findings of Xia and Shang dynasty relics.  Certainty in archeology is generally rare.  Why are you so sure, other than convenience, that this site you are researching is a Xia Dynasty site?

Performative declamation is part of the manner in which Chinese government addresses foreign leaders and governments.  One should remember that zhongguo is considered the most civilized place on earth, the central country, the superior model.  All other countries are vassal states, whether they provide tribute or not, as was expected for two thousand years, from the Xiongnu on to Tibet and Mongolia and Laos and Nepal, at the end of the Qing.  China accepts homage when it works to the benefit of China, but considers itself under no obligation to respond in kind.   So the Chinese government has no qualms about instructing the barbarians, even now, in proper deference to China and the Chinese people.  This is performative declamation in foreign policy jargon.  Tianxia, all under heaven, is properly ruled by the emperor in Beijing, even in the 21st century.

Performative declamation is not only for external communication.  In the innumerable – and per CCP officials, seemingly endless – meetings to discuss elements of business, it is customary for every individual in the meeting to speak, to offer an opinion.  But how to know what opinion to offer?  Following the message of the leader is not unknown in American business meetings.  But what if the big leader in the room has not arrived yet, or does not speak first?  What to do?

Contrary to expectations, the big leader in the room in any meeting does not necessarily always speak first.   The big leader could speak first, and indicate what course of action he wants to follow.  Subordinates, all of whom get to speak as well, then know how to declaim.  The big leader may leave, if he has other commitments; but the subordinates all remain to perform.  All participants watch each other.  If the big leader in the room speaks last, it will usually be clear from his assistant what path he wishes to follow, so subordinates will be able to perform well in any case.  Lest you think I exaggerate on the requirement that subordinates exude praise and follow the leader, there is a  term for this behavior toward the leader – pai ma pi, which means, patting the horse’s ass.  Everyone in China knows this phrase.

Depending on the leader, some real discussion and disagreement may be permitted.   This permission may be simply the habit of that particular leader, or the subject matter may indicate that real opinions are sought.   But if the leader in the room is very powerful, then disagreement tends to disappear, as it might in meetings in the US.  Disagreement brings loss of face, even for a powerful leader.  Just as Hanfeizi said, if a proposal is not favored by the leader, then the suggester’s loyalty should be questioned. There is no such thing as loyal opposition or heeding the advice of the lone voice.

The constant sense of the need to struggle develops another form of anxiety in China, one that is seen in government, in the CCP, in business, in schools.  That is the need to perform, immediately, upon demand.   Urgency is a form of currency – ability to perform quickly for a particular leader is a show of respect, and gives face to that leader.

We understand urgency in the US – real deadlines and arbitrary demands by the boss.   American urgency is usually for the sake of the task, not for the face of the boss, and therein lies a difference.   China is different.

I was at dinner with three university colleagues, all PhDs at my school.   One of the three was the vice dean of the business school, and the other two were senior faculty in that school. After dinner, about 9:00 PM, after drinking – some, not too much – we were driving back to school. Question from the driver to each – should we drop you at home or at the office?  Answer – office, I must go back to finish important work. At night. After dinner. After drinks.

At the time, I was suitably impressed.  Now, some years later, I understand that answer as a sort of performative declamation, an “I work harder than you do” expression.  It was pointless – all three went home directly.

But the pressure to produce, to work harder than anyone else, indeed, to show off for the leader, is always present.  It gives high performance a whole new meaning.

At the Alamo in Hangzhou

Summer, 2004 

One of the fun things to do in Hangzhou is attend the Romance of the Song Dynasty Show.   The Song Dynasty extended for about 300 years, ending in about 1275, with the conquest of the Mongols.   Now I don’t think there are many people in the US who would attend a show titled the Romance of the late Dark Ages, or the Romance of the Era of the Imperial and Magnificent Church.   This was the 1200’s, and we all believe in the progress of history.  But Barbara Tuchman subtitled her famous book about the 14th Century, the next century, the Calamitous 14th Century.    So this emphasis on romance just feels …. sort of misplaced, to me, the westerner. 

Except that this is China.  Now, really, not even I take the Romance of the Song Dynasty performance as a historically accurate guide to events.   The lasers, smoke effects, and stage lighting are probably later inventions.  But the Song is one of the most celebrated and sophisticated of Chinese dynasties, and Hangzhou was the capital city in the late Song, so there is some local promotion going on here too.   When Hangzhou was the capital of the Song, it was one of the wealthiest and largest cities in the world.

The show is only part of a replica Song dynasty Hangzhou, with many streets with shops and costumes for the tourists to wear, and trinkets to buy, and a water-splashing festival and torch festival and an embroidered ball throwing event (a husband selection process, maybe as good as any).

The big show is on a big stage, in a partly open air theater with hundreds of raked seats. The fixed stage is deep and wide – suffice it to say that it accommodates horses, and more than one at a time.  The close-in rows of seats are on a turntable, and retract to uncover a water feature, really pretty necessary in south China.

There are several episodes of the beautifully costumed and choreographed dancing, with fabulous costumes and dozens of dancers and the backflips and leaps you are accustomed to seeing in Shen Yun.  These are part of the main story, the glory of the Song and its extinguishing by the Mongols.

One of the set pieces is a battle, probably the battle of Lin’an in 1275, in which Song forces prepared for one of their last stands against the attacking Mongols.  The staged stone fort housing the Song defenders looks for all the world like the south wall at the Alamo. 

Mongols amassed.  The Alamo -er, Lin’an – in the background

Source: TripAdvisor

I am pretty sure  that the Mongols had far superior numbers at Lin’an, as did the Mexicans. The attacking Mongols have cannons, as did the Mexican army, that sound pretty loud in the performance space, and the attackers are using short ladders, just like at the Alamo, and the defenders are beating them off with the ends of their pikes, and above it all stands Yue Fei, a Song leader, dressed in fabulous military costumed splendor, looking like William Barrett Travis.   The attackers have horses, on stage, and from what I can gather, the result at the Alamo was about the same as the result about 561 years earlier at Lin’an – all the defenders were killed, but the victory was short lived.  Months later, the rebel Texans defeated the Republic of Mexico, and created the Republic of Texas.  About 90 years later, the Ming rousted the ruling Yuan dynasty and drove them out of China, and the battle became an iconic struggle.  I am pretty sure that Yue Fei would have written something similar to Travis’ last appeal from the Alamo –

I am determined to sustain myself as long as possible & die like a soldier
who never forgets what is due to his own honor & that of his country—Victory or Death

 – although he might have referenced the Song emperor rather than the country.  History does seem to rhyme.

One-third Coke, Two-thirds Sprite

Spring, 2011 

For the last six years before I came to China, all of my students at Illinois Institute of Technology in Chicago were zhonguo zhengfu guanyuan, Chinese government officials. Many have become friends, and I stay in touch with them as much as I can. This is about a wedding I attended recently. Michael, one of my government students, picked me up at school.

When Michael got married, in 1990 in the northeastern province of Liaoning, the ceremony was much simpler, he said. At that time, some rural people did not have much money, not even food to eat sometimes, he said. He had been working on a dam project in the south of China, and he took time out from that to get married in Shenyang. His bride was a college classmate, also from Shenyang. He graduated from the university in 1988.

He was happy to accompany me to Hangzhou to the wedding of Chen Yifu and his bride, because he said he learned some things about how young couples do weddings now. Michael is about 45.

There is no standard format to a Chinese wedding, just as there is none in the US, although there are some common features. I am not expert enough to know what is common and what is not, so I will just tell you what I saw.

Not having to worry about churches and ministers seems a really nice difference in the Chinese ceremony, compared with the typical American wedding. For one thing, it makes scheduling easier, since you only have to schedule one venue on one day. In general, that is a hotel or big restaurant. There are enough people in China so that weddings happen every day of the week, and are scheduled in some places like clockwork. Ten o’clock to twelve o’clock. One o’clock to three o’clock . Four to Six. None of the American standing around to see if the groom shows up, or if the best man is drunk or not. If you don’t start on time, you might end up marrying the next guy or girl in line for the banquet hall.

Chen Yifu is an interpreter in the foreign affairs department of the province, so he has a pretty sophisticated job. He has a lot of friends, and since he is only 29, a lot of people will want to be his friend for a long time. The banquet hall was full, and I figured that to be about 400 people. The usual friends, family, and co-workers. In this case, that included about twenty of the fellow government officials from IIT in Chicago. They came from Hangzhou, of course, but from all over the province, some from four or five hours away by car or bus or train. Did you know anyone from work who traveled five hours by bus to get to your wedding? Many friendships are deeper here.

The wedding is simply a personal celebration of commitment, and is a fun and happy occasion without the overlay of religious and moral depression. No one has to feel bad, or has to worry about the relationship between love for one’s partner and commitment to a body of religious dogma. You and me, babe. And nobody else.

Chen was happy to have his leader, the chief of the Provincial Foreign Affairs office, do a toast and little speech near the end. That really signals his importance, and his future prospects, and the importance of Party as family.

Before the ceremony, the room looked pretty much like a hotel wedding reception set up anywhere in Chicago. About 36 tables, ten people to a round table. Defined center aisle for the procession, and a raised stage for the performance.

There were some differences, though. The opening music was a progression of themes, from the old MGM movie opening theme, to the Carmen Burina music in the Steven Spielberg movies, the part where the bad guys are just about to roast the virgin, to the Star Wars opening.

After Star Wars, the lights dimmed, and the focus went to the big screen set up, where there was a five minute show of baby pictures and growing up pictures of the bride and groom, set to some decent music so that it was pretty fun to watch. And not just single picture after another, but each screen was a montage of shots, and some faded in and some out, as if it had been designed by someone who was not the brother-in-law. And then, to applause, the procession of the bride and groom, only. No best man, no wedding party, no in laws. They were already in the room, at the tables.

It is probably a waste of electrons to write that the bride was radiant, but its true. She had a big white dress with lots of petticoat like things and some silver spangles near the middle, to go along with her big dark eyes, and a big red rose pinned to the top. No strap, shoulder-less dress. Very pretty. She had a diamond tiara like headband that worked great with the dress and the eyes. Chen wore a tux with a flower in the lapel, and looked pretty sharp himself.

Chen and his wife, Hu Yuanyuan were the focus of attention, obviously, but they were also the masters of ceremony here. After the procession, they mounted the stage and with dual microphones, did some introductions and thanks and moved on to a serenade to each other, each taking a part and standing at either end of the platform. This is where all the Chinese singing practice comes in handy. Both had good voices, and were not afraid to use them. If I didn’t know them, I might have figured them for a new stage act. After lots of applause, they proceeded to another video piece, this time a sort of cartoon celebrating their parents, and how their parents were getting older, and how much they had learned over the years from their parents, and how even in their old age (Chen is 29 years old, so his parents might be as much as 55) they should take heart, because, in the last slide of the video, they should expect a new addition to the family some day.

There were stage flood lights on the couple, and video recording of the event, and it was well choreographed. There must have been some rehearsal for this, but I think the hotel people have done this before, so my guess is that if you give them cues, they can present the music and lighting very well.

Chen reached in his pocket, and gave Yu a ring, which he slipped on her finger, and she did the same for him. Not all people wear their wedding rings, even if they have them. Some couples do not have rings, or only buy them later when they have the money. The rings were the symbol of commitment to each other, and after that, the parents came up on stage and there were brief speeches by the fathers, and a brief song by the bride and groom to their parents, ending with a joint, wo ai nimen, which is I love you, from each of them to their parents and inlaws.

Other weddings I have seen have fireworks outside after the ceremony, sometimes pretty big ones, but Chen and Yuanyuan did not. There is a procession of cars, some with the same kind of paper flower stuff we do on cars in the US. Chen and bride stayed around for another hour or two. Ms. Yu had changed into another big dress, purple this time, with lots of petticoats and frills. They went around from table to table, doing toasts and offering guests a small gift, nuts or cigarettes. This was the picture and congratulations time.

The ceremony part took all of about 45 minutes, and it’s a good thing, because people were starting to eye the bottles of mao tai sitting on each table. Mao tai is the preferred brand of strong Chinese clear alcohol, pretty much like vodka. It is the drink of choice for early toasts, and later toasts if people can keep going.

I sat with seven or eight of the students from last year in Chicago, along with the provincial organization department representative, Mr. Wu, who sends Zhejiang Province people to IIT. Food was the Chinese version of pasta, chicken, and polish sausage that dominated weddings on the south side of Chicago that I attended when I was 29. Beautifully prepared fish, tender and juicy chicken arranged in a separate dark meat-light meat bowl, duck cut up and rearranged in pieces shaped to look like a flying duck, several vegetable dishes, nuts, intricately carved fruit, beautifully arranged shrimp, …. Okay, maybe a lot nicer than Chicago south side weddings in 1979. As you all know, everyone in the world tells Americans what bad food they eat, and the food at the wedding is a clear reminder that Americans have a lot to learn about good eating.

There were no flower centerpieces on the tables, which would be a problem with the food all sitting on the zhuan pan (lazy susan) on each table. But the center aisle of the banquet hall was lined with flowers in standing containers, each about four feet high. The tables were loaded with food, and mao tai, and then beer, and coke, and sprite. As you know, the toasts are a big part of the greeting and bonding at these events, and if it is a government related wedding, my guess is that the toasts are even more meaningful.

I sat next to Kathy Guo Chenglong from last year. Guo is smart and beautiful and has big eyes and long dark hair and a big and easy smile, and her English is very good and she is tall and imperially slim and dresses like a thirty two year old woman in business. Taller, more confident, and holds her head higher than people around her.

So it seemed a natural question- how does she, weighing about 100 pounds (45 kilograms), keep up with the after work business meetings three or four nights a week that she must do as part of the business of government in China? The mao tai stuff is really potent, and no one can drink this stuff for long without bad effects.

The first toast is usually to everyone at the table from the host of the table, and the liquor is that chosen by the person giving the toast. But after that, it is usually possible to make substitutions to beer or wine. It is difficult to avoid having something. But the mao tai is clear, and cannot be distinguished from water after the people around you have had a couple of glasses full, and beer, Guo said, looks pretty much like one third coke and two thirds sprite, and Shaoxing yellow (brown) wine can be approximated with other proportions, and my guess is that Kathy is an expert at that, and that is how she gets through the evenings. But don’t tell anyone.

Some of the guests at the wedding had come from a long way to attend, and did not want to go home right after the ceremony. You know about KTV, the ubiquitous karaoke palaces. We adjourned to one not far from the hotel, about 14 of us. It looked as if it would be all men, which was going to be a little depressing, but then three of our government official female students showed up, which made singing a little easier. Better voices, and more range. The women said that the men were a little shy about singing, and in some cases that is for good reason. Me, included. But I had to try, to summon the strength. Some of the men had good voices, but Mr. Wu, the organization department man, would not participate at all. Too embarrassed. He sat there, and enjoyed the show, but he didn’t make any selections for himself at the big karaoke song selection computer.

As the guest at the KTV event, I had to find a couple of songs to sing, and you know that is not too hard. There are hundreds of songs in English, but most of them are from this century, and my musical knowledge is from the prior one. And I never participated in any national day singing competitions, so my voice is perennially rusty. But I could find Desperado, and Edelweis, and everybody in China knows Edelweis, so they could sing along, and the words apply equally well in Austria, and China, and the US. And after about an hour, I dragged the provincial organization department head up to the front, and he sort of stood there while I sang Edelweis, and getting him involved was a good thing for the group, and for me, and I think for him. Get him out of his shell. I think that is my job in China. I was sort of the American Fraulein Maria, played by me instead of Julie Andrews, with Mr. Wu as Commander von Trapp.

The singing went on for a couple of hours, pretty much everybody taking a turn or two and joining in on others. The video backgrounds to each song are usually in keeping with the love seeking, love found, love lost themes of most songs. But three songs had inexplicable rugby scene videos as part of some kind of love song, with Chinese rugby players, and the students knew that I had played that long ago, so there was some connection for them and me. But at the end of the day, nothing compares with singing Desperado, or Edelweiss, in English with a bunch of Chinese friends, with Chinese accompaniment, in China and away from home, and being by far the oldest person in the room, and wondering what is going through everybody else’s heads as you contemplate letting somebody love you and bless my homeland forever.

Nothing compares. This is golden.