Confucianism - Freedom and democracy 2.0 Is Confucianism a religion? VI. What is a virtue ethic?

Confucianism - Freedom and democracy 2.0

Is Confucianism a religion?

      VI. What is a virtue ethic? What would your mother say?

Sections below –

What is a virtue?  

What is a virtue ethic?  

What else is there?  

How are the moralities different?  

Virtue ethic caveats  

How are virtue ethics different from each other?  

So what are the virtues?  

Confucian virtues  

How a virtue ethic works  

Commitment and a virtuous act  

Virtuous people and virtuous politics  

Why Be moral?  

What to do with the incorrigible or the mass murderer?  

What is a virtue?

The Aristotelian definition of virtue is an excellent trait of character or “activity in accordance with reason.” Augustine counters with a definition of virtue as love of God or, in later texts, as love of God and neighbor. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy suggests an inner disposition or motivational habit that enables us to perform every action we perform out of right love.

The Catholic Church defines virtue as a “habitual and firm disposition to do the good.” Aquinas defines virtue as “a good habit bearing on activity.” Habit and disposition reminds one of Thinking, Fast and Slow the groundbreaking work by Daniel Kahneman on decision-making and the learned responses that Joshua Greene describes in his book Moral Tribes. Right action requires thought and practice to become ingrained. Virtues are learned and require practice.

Noted Confucian scholar Stephen Angle defines virtues as "robust dispositions that spontaneously can guide the style and substance of our reactions to our environment."

No real disagreements on any of these. We seem to generally agree on what constitutes virtue.

What is a virtue ethic?

A virtue ethic takes the notion of virtue as fundamental. It is first concerned with traits of character essential to human flourishing, rather than a list of obligations or calculations one might see in Kantian or Benthamite ethics.

Christianity is a virtue ethic, along with the ethics of Aristotle and Confucius. Christianity was the only morality in the west for nearly two thousand years. Christian morality never told believers what to do by way of universal rules or individual rationality beyond generalities of natural law and biblical principles like the commandments and the beatitudes. It used stories of exemplars and parables - Jesus, saints, popes - as models to be emulated in decision-making and action.  That is part of how a virtue ethic informs.

A virtue ethic understands human agency, humans acting in the world, as necessary to shaping individual character. No one becomes moral or humane by himself. As a consequence, a virtue ethic is necessarily socially constructed – virtue and morality are expressed in relationship with others. There are no virtuous monks living a solitary life on a mountaintop. How would virtue be expressed?

The Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy (Routledge, 2003) defines virtue ethic as a theory, to use David Wong’s words, that “provides guidance to the individual primarily through description of ideal personhood and character traits to be realized rather than the application of general principles purporting to identify general characteristics of right or dutiful action.”

Bryan Van Norden identifies four crucial features for a virtue ethic that set it apart from a rule based or consequentialist ethics. The four are - (1) an account of what is a flourishing human life; (2) an account of what virtues contribute to leading such a life; (3) an account of how one acquires those virtues, and (4) a philosophical anthropology that explains what humans are like.

Bryan W. Van Norden. Toward a Synthesis of Confucianism and Aristotelianism. In Virtue Ethics and Confucianism, Stephen Angle and Michael Slote, eds.  Routledge, 2013. Available at https://www.academia.edu/12762325/TowardaSynthesisofConfucianismandAristotelianism

Also -

Bryan W. Van Norden. Virtue Ethics and Confucianism. Chapter 5 in Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, 2009. Available at https://www.academia.edu/12762328/BWVNVirtueEthicsandConfucianism?emailworkcard=view-paper

The concept of a virtue ethic is that a virtuous person will perform a virtuous act naturally, particularly in complex situations, more easily than someone who is following a standardized rule. This is the moral equivalent of the answer to, “how do you get to Carnegie Hall?”

Virtue ethicist Linda Zagzebski explains more in a wonderful series of short youtube videos on virtue ethics.  They provide an excellent background.  

What else is there?

Virtue ethics are one of the three major approaches to ethics, the others being deontology and utilitarianism. Deontology, associated with Kant and Rawls, says morality should be based on conformity with universal rules (the categorical imperative) and based on reason independent of any theology. Kant’s Enlightenment idea was to remove morality from the sole purview of the Church. Rawls seems to take morality a step further with his veil of ignorance, seeming to remove morality from human sociality completely. He assumes that everyone will make the same choices behind the veil of ignorance.

Utilitarianism, associated with Bentham and Mill, focuses on the consequences of action (the greatest good for the greatest number or greatest happiness principle). Governments now tend to use a default utilitarian rationale for controversial actions, sort of a majority opinion rule.

There are virtues in rule-based or consequentialist moralities. The difference is that a virtue ethic focuses on creating an individual who can be virtuous, rather than an individual who follows an external rule for guidance. A virtue ethic focuses on modeling the virtuous actions of exemplars and self-cultivation to understand the good. This requires education and practice.

Confucianism has similarities with Judaism in promoting education of the self, filial respect, and respect for ritual.

How are the moralities different?

With the Enlightenment, morality based solely on Christian religious belief fell out of intellectual favor. Christian morality made way in governance, public policy, and mainstream thought for deontology (Kantian rules) and Benthamite calculus (utilitarianism).  Broadly speaking, utilitarianism finds the highest good in optimization of some element of human life, and the ends justify the means. A common meme is “the greatest good for the greatest number.” Deontology finds that the ends do not justify the means, and the only moral means are those that satisfy a universal human law. Thus we have Kant’s categorical imperative.

With rules or a calculus for ethical behavior we end up with conundrums like the trolley problem and the proliferation of ethical codes in business schools, the idea that ethical behavior can be described in a list. We do see that ethics codes in business seem not to accomplish much.

Virtue ethics focuses on a lifetime cultivation of virtue, with some emphasis on the actions of virtuous exemplars from the past. A virtue ethic would not understand the trolley problem without much more detail than is usually provided; notably, students in the classroom usually want that kind of information when they try to formulate an answer to the trolley problem – ages, education, relationships. Students are seeking context, and virtue ethics is highly context dependent. A virtue ethic doesn’t solve the trolley problem, but brings it into a real community of lives.

If we cannot find an ethical solution in a universal code or rulebook then that suggests moral sensitivity, perception, imagination, and judgment informed by experience—phronesis in short—are needed to apply rules or principles correctly. These are characteristic of virtue ethics. It should be noted that an ethic that requires constant learning and reflection is tough, much tougher than an ethic that can look up proper behavior in a rule book or in a definitive calculation of happiness.

In our increasingly pluralist and complex world, universal rules and summing utilities can’t always promote sufficiently good outcomes. Isaiah Berlin reminded us that different experiences alter concepts and categories, some virtues must end up being simultaneously incompatible, and our calculations and rules must necessarily fail at some times. The universal rules seem not to be so universal, and adding up utilities leaves too many people outside the economy and the society. What’s more, pluralism requires tolerance. Like it or not, pluralist democracy requires tolerance of different ideas, even somewhat different interpretation of morality up to a point. The search for a universal truth in morality is proving dangerous in our plural society.

Political philosopher Isaiah Berlin on tolerance and prejudice –

Few things have done more harm than the belief on the part of individuals or groups (or tribes or states or nations or churches) that he or she or they are in sole possession of the truth: especially about how to live, what to be and do—and that those who differ from them are not merely mistaken, but wicked or mad: and need restraining or suppressing. It is a terrible and dangerous arrogance to believe that you alone are right: have a magical eye which sees the truth: and that others cannot be right if they disagree.

Isaiah Berlin. Notes on Prejudice. The New York Review of Books, October 18, 2001.  Available at https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2001/10/18/notes-on-prejudice/

Virtue ethicist Michael Slote tells us the virtue of virtue ethics is in seeing empathy at the core of moral approval or disapproval. Slote sees a compatibility between early Christian love and Confucian benevolence that results in a virtue ethic he terms moral sentimentalism.

Michael Slote. The Mandate of Empathy. Dao, 9:3, 2010.  Available at https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/springer-journals/the-mandate-of-empathy-ryS687QV0H?articleList=%2Fsearch%3Fquery%3Dmichael%2Bslote%2Bdao

It is easy today to see that a universal rule or a benefit calculation doesn’t quite fit. Health of the mother or the fetus? Is health care a right? Prohibitions on abortion but not on capital punishment?  Right to die? Which should come first, civil rights or social and economic rights?  A virtue ethic won’t necessarily provide answers, but it allows for more than one definition of the right thing to do. A virtue ethic makes people stop and think before acting, particularly with regard to the impact upon others.  

Of course, Kantian and Rawlsian ethics and utilitarianism extoll virtues, but as Huang Yong comments in Some Fundamental Issues in Confucian Ethics  - While virtue is merely useful in helping one follow the moral law in Kant and maximizing happiness in Mill, therefore with only a secondary status, in virtue ethics, virtue is the most fundamental idea in our moral evaluations, as opposed to obligation in deontology and happiness in utilitarianism.

Utilitarianism is completely comfortable with the concept of a sovereign individual who owes nothing to anyone. All one need do is add up the individual costs and benefits of any proposed public policy, and you have determined a path by which to proceed. Kantian ethics recognizes the sociality, the obligations we have to each other, but assumes that universal moral rules are accepted by and can be understood by all.

Jesus never provided universal rules for day to day morality; nor would Christianity simply add up the costs and benefits of a policy and do a rational calculation. A virtue ethic is communal, social to the core. The moral individual does the right thing, not because of rules or calculus, but because it is the most human – we could say humane - thing to do.  This is very similar to the Christian idea. One acts out of love or concern for the other. For neither can the end justify the means. The moral act requires a prior commitment to do the right thing. That commitment results partly from experience and partly from faith. Similarly, “practice makes perfect” and moral education are requirements for Aristotle and Confucians.

Bryan Van Norden has a nice summary of a virtue ethic and a distinction from Kantian and Benthamite ethics –

It is important to see that ethical particularism is not irrational. It is a requirement of rationality that ethically similar cases be treated similarly, but it is not a requirement that this similarity be captured by rules that are highly abstract, nor is it a requirement that we be able to state necessary and sufficient (and non-trivial) conditions for an action’s being cruel, cowardly, unjust, sexist, etc. Necessary and sufficient conditions are the hobgoblin of ethically small minds. This does not mean that we cannot have intelligent discussions of cases in which we disagree or in which our ethical perception is unclear. I cannot give you an abstract rule that always identifies whether something is a good play, a convincing character in a novel, a delicious soup or a shameful action but I can certainly discuss intelligently whether or not a particular thing fits into one of these categories. 

Bryan W. Van Norden. Virtue Ethics and Confucianism.  Chapter 5 in Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, 2009. Available at https://www.academia.edu/1276232/BWVNVirtueEthicsandConfucianism?emailworkcard=view-paper

Virtue ethic caveats

Some fault virtue ethics for its attempt to derive an “ought” from an “is” – that statements about facts in the world leading to obligations on the part of others. Individualistic ethics don’t suffer from that confusion. Universal rules and calculations of benefit suffice as moral guides, and is and ought can live in different worlds.

But the conflation of is and ought is precisely the point in virtue ethics. Mencius says what is characteristically human is not rationality, but virtues, particularly humaneness. This is the early Christian point as well. We see suffering and we feel morally obliged to help. Mencius uses the child falling into a well story; Jesus uses the Good Samaritan story. In neither story is the actor being entirely rational, if rational only means self-interested.

Rationality is not enough. Neither Mencius nor Jesus mention robots, but we can see that robots are rational. Computers are rational. Robots and computers lack the ability to be virtuous. Animals can see, hear, taste, and smell, but they lack the complement of human virtues. For Mencius, as for Zhu Xi, human nature and virtuous behavior are identical and constituted by the four virtues – wisdom, propriety, humanity, and rightness.  It works in reverse as well. If one’s xin, or human nature, is blinded by selfish desire, one becomes an animal.

The is-ought distinction is a false distinction in morality. If we are talking mathematics or physics, then of course we have a valid distinction. We would never say an electron really ought to give up some energy right now but is choosing not to. But humans are complex and there is no universal logic. The problem for is-ought lies in the sterility of the “is.” Expansion of the “is” to include xin, the heart-mind, or love if you will, provides room for benevolence in an “is” statement.

Mencius shows us the sterility of the is-ought distinction. Would the humane person reason as follows –

My life is valuable and should not be put in danger.

It could be dangerous for me to try to save that child about to fall into a well.

Ok.  Let her go.

This is not reasonable on several counts, not least of which is that the initial is statement is too broad and the second is insufficiently loving or benevolent.  Mencius tells us the humane person would instinctively make the attempt.

Some also claim that a virtue ethic is particularistic, in that it privileges those physically or emotionally close to one more than people at a distance. Perhaps true. We do act that way. At least theoretically neither Christianity nor Confucianism is like that. We reference the Samaritan story and Mencius makes the argument in 1A7 (Liang Hui Wang I) – that suffering at a distance is still suffering, and a king needs to address it. Jing Hu makes the argument in Dao - that empathy can be extended through education to non-kin and people who are far away and unfamiliar.

Jing Hu. Empathy for Non-Kin, the Faraway, the Unfamiliar, and the Abstract––An Interdisciplinary Study on Mencian Moral Cultivation and a Response to Prinz.  Dao 17(3), 2018.  Available at https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/springer-journals/empathy-for-non-kin-the-faraway-the-unfamiliar-and-the-abstract-an-6FlhXxKQ0O?articleList=%2Fsearch%3Fquery%3DJing%2BHu.%2BEmpathy%2Bfor%2BNon-Kin%252C%2Bthe%2BFaraway

A major distinction for a virtue ethic from Kantian or utilitarianism lie in the roles for humility and empathy, neither of which fits easily into a rule based ethic.   

Feminist theorist Sara Rushing makes the argument for humility in Confucianism, but it would apply equally well to Christianity – that humility is a virtue, and requires openness to learning and reflecting, realistic self-assessment that includes the perspective of others as well as a good sense of one’s own worth, and embracing 命 ming, life or fate, that is forward looking and not purely passive.  

How do virtue ethics differ from each other?

That is a large topic. Suffice it to say they can have differences. There is no one virtue ethic, and scholars can disagree on details. David Elstein discusses the varieties in Contemporary Confucianism. Martha Nussbaum and Eric Hutton have questioned whether virtue ethics can be defined at all, and if so, whether Confucius could meet the standard of a virtue ethic. Confucian scholar Stephen Angle and virtue ethicist Michael Slote produced the volume of essays Virtue Ethics and Confucianism which provides a variety of answers as to whether Confucianism is a virtue ethic at all. Most scholars have no problem seeing Confucianism as a virtue ethic.

David Elstein. Contemporary Confucianism.  Available at https://www.academia.edu/24308366/ContemporaryConfucianism

Eric Hutton. On the “Virtue Turn” and the Problem of Categorizing Confucius Thought.  Dao 14:3, 2015.  Available at https://www.academia.edu/15695555/OntheVirtueTurnandtheProblemofCategorizingChineseThoughtwitherratum?emailworkcard=abstract-read-more

Alasdair MacIntyre, the most prominent western virtue ethicist of the last few decades, promotes  Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics as the virtue ethic standard. MacIntyre does find an incompatibility between Confucius and Aristotelian virtue ethics, based on different concepts of the good. As an example, he says, a Confucian might find failure in an otherwise virtuous act because the act did not take sufficient account of li, rites, in performance. An Aristotelian, he says, would not notice such a failure in virtue at all. My own reading is this is too harsh a judgment by MacIntyre. No new Confucian would stand on ceremony in the face of a need to help another human being. We act freely out of love for other human beings.

But the key point in Confucianism is not just to act freely, but to willingly act correctly. A Christian seeing the need for both faith and good works might agree with the Confucian position, if works did not come out of faith. Fundamentally, works without faith or a commitment to pursue the Dao, are meaningless for Christians and Confucians.

Alasdair MacIntyre. Incommensurability, Truth, and the Conversation between Confucians and Aristotelians. In Eliot Deutsch, ed. Culture and Modernity: East-West Philosophic Perspectives. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991

Another distinction – even though Confucians and Aristotle emphasize development of human virtues, they come to different conclusions on the best lived life. For Aristotle, flourishing is the ultimate goal for the individual as well as for the society. The best life is that of a contemplative scholar, a lover of reason. For Confucians, a life lived in community, a good or noble person, a lover of other people, is the highest outcome.  They disagree somewhat on a list of virtues, the role of family in a good life, the role of classic texts in self-cultivation, and the significance of ritual. May Sim says the two differ in methodology. Aristotle’s view is based on metaphysics – what exists – and Confucius’ view in based only on tradition. But she also notes the similarity between the Aristotelian Golden Mean – virtues are a mean between extreme states - and the Confucian notion of harmony as a balance of yin and yang.

May Sim. Remastering Morals with Aristotle and Confucius  (Cambridge, 2007)

Ni Peimin -

First, the moral content and guidance in Aristotle’s system lead one toward the ideal life of a self-sufficient contemplator more than anything else, whereas Confucian moral content and guidance lead one toward an exemplary individual who is fully immersed in social relatedness and practical life. 

Ni Peimin. How far is Confucius an Aristotelian?: Comments on May Sim’s Remastering Morals with Aristotle and Confucius.  Dao 8 (2009) Available at https://www.academia.edu/6150021/HowfarisConfuciusanAristotelianCommentsonMaySimsRemasteringMoralswithAristotleandConfucius?auto=download&emailworkcard=download-paper

The cardinal virtues described by Plato and Aristotle are prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice.

To these, the Church adds theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity (1 Corinthians 13:13)  Aquinas put wisdom in place of prudence, but saw that all humans shared the natural virtues.

In Greek and Christian conceptions, virtues must be practiced to become ingrained. No one is born prudent or charitable. The life-long learning process is one of learning to become fully human, fully virtuous. This is an unattainable practical goal, but it is the ideal. So, too, in Confucian virtues. 

Confucian virtues

Virtues are not so clearly laid out in the Confucian four books as they are in Aristotle or Thomas.  Perhaps best known of the Confucian passages about virtue is the five obligations from the ZhongYong – The duties of universal obligation are five and the virtues wherewith they are practiced are three. The duties are those between sovereign and minister, between father and son, between husband and wife, between elder brother and younger, and those belonging to the intercourse of friends. Those five are the duties of universal obligation. Knowledge, magnanimity, and energy, these three, are the virtues universally binding.  Knowledge, magnanimity and energy are only three. Several passages add wisdom and humanity as principle virtues for Confucius. See Analects 4.1, 4.2, 6.22, 6.23, and 12.22.  In other passages Confucian virtues include benevolence, ritual propriety, wisdom, and trustworthiness.

In Analects 17:6, Confucius is asked about virtue –

Confucius said, "To be able to practice five things everywhere under heaven constitutes perfect virtue." He begged to ask what they were, and was told, "Gravity, generosity of soul, sincerity, earnestness, and kindness. If you are grave, you will not be treated with disrespect. If you are generous, you will win all. If you are sincere, people will repose trust in you. If you are earnest, you will accomplish much. If you are kind, this will enable you to employ the services of others."

These are called the five constant virtues - Benevolence (rén 仁), righteousness (yì 义), propriety (lǐ 礼), wisdom (zhì 智) and fidelity (xìn 信) 

Not so far from the Beatitudes, and not a word about rights in either.

Other teachings from Chinese culture provide similar guidance. Daoism talks about the Five Beauties of the human character: Kindness; Proper Conduct; Propriety; Wisdom, Trustworthiness. The Daoist Eight-fold Path and the Chinese emperor Guan’s Book of Enlightenment list eight virtues by which we become fully human -

1- Filial Piety - 孝 (xiào):  Reverence and loving care of our parents – teachers – elders.

2- Harmony -  和 (hé):  Sibling Harmony, respect for your brothers, to live at peace as brothers and sisters, respectful of others.

3- Loyalty -  忠 (zhōng): Unswerving allegiance in everything you do, dedication, faithfulness, commitment.

4- Trust -  信 (xìn): Trustworthiness, keeping promises, integrity, sincerity, honesty.

5- Propriety -   仁 (rén) :  Courtesy, etiquette, politeness, manners.

6- Righteousness - 義 (yì):  The moral disposition to do good, justice.

7- Integrity - 信 (lian):  Being non-corrupt, incorruptible, taking only what you deserve, having earned it.

8- Shame -  恥/耻  (chǐ ): Judge and sense of right and wrong, sense of shame, shamefulness, conscientiousness, cognizant of shameful action and avoiding it.

It’s not surprising that lists of virtues are similar all over the world. With difficulties in interpretation and translation over centuries, no one should make too much of their favorite virtue missing from a list from another culture. Natural law is pretty much the same everywhere – some local version of the Golden Rule and don’t lie, steal or murder. Ok. That’s good advice.

The Confucian idea, mostly due to Mencius, is that people are born good. There is no concept of being born with original sin. With birth, people have four hearts, or four proto-virtues – compassion, shame, deference, and judgment. Mencius describes all in the famous “seeing a child about to fall into the well” passage in Mencius 2A.6 (Gong Sun Chou) -

Supposing people see a child fall into a well - they all have a heart-mind that is shocked and sympathetic. It is not for the sake of being on good terms with the child's parents, and it is not for the sake of winning praise for neighbors and friends, nor is it because they dislike the child's noisy cry…. From this case we may perceive that the feeling of commiseration is essential to man, that the feeling of shame and dislike is essential to man, that the feeling of modesty and complaisance is essential to man, and that the feeling of approving and disapproving is essential to man. The feeling of commiseration is the principle of benevolence. The feeling of shame and dislike is the principle of righteousness. The feeling of modesty and complaisance is the principle of propriety. The feeling of approving and disapproving is the principle of knowledge. Men have these four principles just as they have their four limbs.

Mencius saw four proto-virtues inherent in humans.  He termed them “sprouts” that over time with proper education and training could grow into virtues.

Sprouts                                     Virtues

Compassion                              Benevolence     ren

Shame or disdain                       Righteousness   yi

Deference                                 Propriety          xiao

Approval and disapproval           Wisdom            zhi

Bryan Van Norden in Virtue Ethics and Confucianism. Chapter 5 in (unnamed document).  Available at https://www.academia.edu/12762328/BWVNVirtueEthicsandConfucianism

Mencius’ virtue list doesn’t match up exactly with prudence, fortitude, wisdom, and justice, but they overlap quite a bit with the Daoist Eight-fold Path. Western prudence might map to Confucian sincerity and earnestness; fortitude to gravity and energy; temperance to gravity and knowledge; justice to kindness and magnanimity; faith and hope probably to generosity of soul and knowledge; and charity to generosity of soul and kindness. It really isn’t so surprising that named virtues would be similar across cultures, even if interpretations vary. 

In Confucianism, human nature and human virtues are not two separate things. Indeed they are identical. For example, Zhu Xi states that “human nature is the undistinguished whole of the substance of the ultimate…. It entails ten thousand principles, of which the most fundamental are the following four, humanity, rightness, propriety, and wisdom.”  So humanity, rightness, propriety, and wisdom are both what constitute humans as humans (human nature) and the character traits one ought to have (virtues) in order to be non-defective human beings.

How a virtue ethic works

A virtue ethic requires three elements – exemplars to model, moral education, and a useful life plan or goal. One’s exemplars should probably not tend toward movie stars, athletes, or – now – current political figures. American conservatives often reference past secular or religious leaders. Both of these are generally better than current popular figures. (By the way, wishing for leaders free of failings, moral or otherwise, is pointless. Exemplar leaders with flaws are to be preferred).  Moral education begins at home, as most parents would say. Some liberal parents either provide no direct moral education for children or find it somehow intrusive. There cannot be a bigger mistake than to leave morality up to what one learns on the street. Moral education is a principal rationale for Catholic schools and for religious fundamentalist schools.  The useful life plan or goal is tough. Who has any idea what that means at age 13 or 18 or 23?  The moral training can be a surrogate for a life plan for a while, but the life plan doesn’t have to mean a vocation or a commitment to a trade. It does mean a commitment to an excellence that in itself teaches the benefits of the virtues. That is one reason for religious or civic education – it provides a foundation, a reference that is available lifelong.  

Edward Slingerland describes what a virtue ethic does in decision-making -

The harmony that is achieved between inner emotional states and the dictates of morality allows the Confucian sage to act in accordance with the principles and rules by which ethical practices are constituted, while at the same time displaying a level of autonomy and flexibility impossible

for one who is merely “going by the book.” Indeed, one cannot be said to have properly mastered a set of principles until one knows how to apply them skillfully and in a context-sensitive manner.

Edward Slingerland.  Virtue Ethics, the Analects, and the Problem of Commensurability.  Journal of Religious Ethics 29:1 2001. Available at https://www.academia.edu/33184016/VirtueEthicsTheAnalectsandtheProblemofCommensurability

When the government or a dominant religion provides a telos, a goal for all, then people can ascribe wisdom to that and structure their lives around meeting the goal, whether the goal is the City of God or the communist utopia. In the real world that single telos is really not feasible. One’s life plan can be simple and changeable.

Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of a practice is just such a tool to help avoid the need for a common telos in a plural society. Such practice at a skill teaches one the virtues of prudence (measure twice, cut once) fortitude (a stick-to-itiveness) tolerance for mistakes and tolerance in the materials, temperance (work when ready, stop when tired) and justice (proper judging of materials and skills according to circumstance). Confucius teaches the same idea in Analects 11.22, when he advises students differently for the same situation, based on his knowledge of their character and proclivities. Robert Pirsig teaches similarly in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.  He references the Daoist story from Zhuangzi about the butcher who cuts up an ox seemingly without effort after years of practice. The butcher is in the flow of his work.

MacIntyre’s idea of a practice allows one’s natural abilities and intuition to flow with one’s environment. With sufficient practice and training, one can simply perform. I don’t think Willy Mays was a virtue ethicist, but he told us about being in the flow when asked about his greatest catch - "I don't compare 'em, I just catch 'em". Even DeTocqueville promotes the notion of a practice to help achieve “self-interest, rightly understood.” Such practice would provide a discipline sorely lacking in current day liberalism -

The principle of self-interest rightly understood produces no great acts of self-sacrifice, but it suggests daily small acts of self-denial. By itself it cannot suffice to make a man virtuous; but it disciplines a number of persons in habits of regularity, temperance, moderation, foresight, self- command; and if it does not lead men straight to virtue by the will, it gradually draws them in that direction by their habits.

Alexis de Tocqueville. Democracy in America. Chapter VIII - How The Americans Combat Individualism By The Principle Of Self-Interest Rightly Understood. (1835) Available at https://history.hanover.edu/courses/excerpts/111tocqueville.html

Huang Yong and Robert Carleo cite Kim Sungmoon in summarizing the concept of a Confucian politics in three approaches – first, the ruler should exhibit good moral character; that it is a legitimate function of government to promote virtue among the people; and political institutions should be evaluated not only for efficiency but also for virtuous performance and conduct.  This would, of course, mean that governments get past the single goal of citizens being law abiding and take a more activist role. The government would take a somewhat more intrusive interest in private lives.

HUANG Yong and Robert A. Carleo III. Confucian Political Philosophy: The State of the Field. In Introduction: Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy – Dialogues on the State of the Field. HUANG Yong and Robert A. Carleo III, eds. Available at https://www.academia.edu/44921365/Introduction_Contemporary_Confucian_Political_Philosophy

Commitment and a virtuous act

Several scholars observe that Confucian empathy is insufficient for a virtuous life – the argument being empathy is not “self-directing” – it does not provide practical advice on what to do in particular situations. This is probably correct. The additional element for Confucians would be li, ritual or rites, to inform particular action – what can we learn from precedent and custom?  It is partly for this reason that Confucians can say – along with Christians – that virtuous action alone is insufficient to be called virtue or grace. One must perform an action with faith as instruction and guide – either faith in the rituals and examples from exemplars or faith in Jesus.

This inability of a virtue ethic to define a behavioral rule is seen by some as a defect; it is seen by others as a most excellent characteristic, the demand and the limitation being that the excellent man will usually make excellent decisions.  An important feature of virtue ethics is that it can be culturally relative and socially determined, when the other two approaches see the lone individual as the only relevant moral actor.  Varieties of virtue ethics all understand humans as socially constituted.  As Karl Popper told us, “We are social creatures to the inmost centre of our being. The notion that one can begin anything at all from scratch, free from the past, or unindebted to others, could not conceivably be more wrong.”

The required Christian commitment is laid out in the Beatitudes in Matthew 5:3-12 -

Blessed are the poor in spirit,
    for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven.
Blessed are those who mourn,
    for they will be comforted.
Blessed are the meek,
    for they will inherit the Earth.
Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness,
    for they will be satisfied.
Blessed are the merciful,
    for they will be shown mercy.
Blessed are the pure in heart,
    for they will see God.
Blessed are the peacemakers,
    for they will be called children of God.
Blessed are those who are persecuted because of righteousness,
    for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven.
Blessed are you when people insult you, persecute you and falsely say all kinds of evil against you because of me.
Rejoice and be glad, because great is your reward in heaven, for in the same way they persecuted the prophets who were before you.

The Beatitudes require a commitment, not just a comment. There is a discussion in Christianity about how salvation works – is faith alone sufficient, or are works required also?  Both have biblical justification.  Faith without works seems empty. A way around the conundrum is to notice that with faith, works will come. (Whether works alone are sufficient is another story). With faith will come tendency to virtuous acts – though practice is still required.

It will surprise many to find that the Confucian idea of virtue is similar to the Christian one – that truly virtuous acts must stem from virtuous intent. One sees this Mencius 4B:47 (Li Lou 2) -

Mencius said, 'That whereby man differs from the lower animals is but small. The mass of people cast it away, while superior men preserve it. Shun clearly understood the multitude of things, and closely observed the relations of humanity. He walked along the path of benevolence and righteousness; he did not need to pursue benevolence and righteousness.’

The interpretation of this last sentence is that one ought to practice from benevolence and rightness and not merely practice benevolence and rightness. The actions may be the same, but the character of the persons performing the actions are different. The person who practices from benevolence and rightness, as from faith, the actions flowing from these virtues will almost certainly be benevolent and right.

When one practices from benevolence and rightness, benevolence and rightness are one’s virtues, and actions flowing from these virtuous must be benevolent and right.

Virtuous politics

Confucianism requires that government take an active role in helping people flourish.  Government can and should define a notion of the good for people – health, education, care for those needing it. 

Virtue alone is not enough. The institutions of government must be properly aligned to promote virtue. Mencius 4A.1 (Li Lou I.1) - there are rulers with benevolent hearts and a reputation of benevolence, and yet they cannot benefit their people and set examples for their posterity; the reason is precisely that they don’t follow the political institutions of the former kings …

How to evaluate a government action? In the same Mencius 4A.1 -

… having taxed their heart-mind to its utmost capacity, the former kings went on to establish the political institutions that cannot bear to see others’ suffering, thus putting the whole world under the shelter of their benevolence….

HUANG Yong makes the argument that treating everyone the same – equal opportunity for  theoretically equal individuals – is not Confucian (nor is it Christian). Huang in the Introduction: Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy 

What we can see from Mencius here is an analogue of how virtue ethics evaluate an action: an action is morally right if it is what a virtuous person would characteristically do in such a particular situation; thus, a law is just if it is what a virtuous legislator would make. 

Colloquially, we ask ourselves to think of what our mothers would do.

Joseph Chan suggests Confucianism “should offer a list of items that constitute the good life and good social order—such as valuable social relationships, practical wisdom and learning, sincerity, harmony, social and political trust and care, moral and personal autonomy, and economic sufficiency and self-responsibility (Chan, Confucian Perfectionism, p 203)

Chan espouses the practicality of a modern Confucianism -

The Confucian perfectionism in political philosophy and politics that I espouse thus takes the form of moderate perfectionism. As a moral philosophy Confucianism may develop its conception of the good life comprehensively and rigorously. However, as a political or public philosophy for modern times, this conception should not be derived from a comprehensive doctrine of the good….

The goods that Joseph Chan’s Confucian perfectionism aims to promote include mostly moral goods (other-regarding), which are not controversial. Confucianism can also support a different list: “the state may promote specific valuable goods such as the arts, knowledge, family life, and other valuable social relationships, and basic human virtues such as benevolence, courage, and practical wisdom” (Chan p 102).

As the ruler is father to the people, he should act as a father toward his family. Confucianism would not shy away from government cultivating virtue among the people. This was Aristotle’s view as well. But promoting virtue requires that government take a stand on what is the good, rather than let individuals decide for themselves. Governments in the US are well out of the practice of promoting virtue, even civic virtue.

Confucianism supports providing benefits to those in need. It does suggest that assistance should come first from one’s family, second from the society (what we would consider nonprofits) and lastly from the government. We see the need for assistance in many passages, but this is from  

Xunzi 9.4 – Select good and worthy men for office, promote those who are honest and reverent, reward filial piety and brotherly affection, gather under your protection orphans and widows, and offer assistance to those in poverty and need.

The level of assistance must be more than that needed to escape extreme privation. Assistance should be sufficient to permit people to self-cultivate, so good education is part of the prescription.

Mencius has a relatively comprehensive suggestion in Mencius 1A.7 (Liang Hui Wang I.7) -

Therefore an intelligent ruler will regulate the livelihood of the people, so as to make sure that, for those above them, they shall have sufficient wherewith to serve their parents, and, for those below them, sufficient wherewith to support their wives and children; that in good years they shall always be abundantly satisfied, and that in bad years they shall escape the danger of perishing. After this he may urge them, and they will proceed to what is good, for in this case the people will follow after it with ease.

Mencius encourages substantial assistance to those in need. In the absence of basic human needs, What leisure have they to cultivate propriety and righteousness?

Let careful attention be paid to education in schools, the inculcation in it especially of the filial and fraternal duties, and grey-haired men will not be seen upon the roads, carrying burdens on their backs or on their heads.

Why be moral?

The question has been asked by philosophers in the west and the east, but it seems particularly pertinent in the toxic narcissism and individual sovereignty of present day America. HUANG Yong discusses the Confucian and western response in Why Be Moral?  The Cheng Brothers' Neo-Confucian Answer.  Confucius’ answer is in Analects 14.28 - The Master said, "The way of the superior man is threefold, but I am not equal to it. Virtuous, he is free from anxieties; wise, he is free from perplexities; bold, he is free from fear." Zi Gong said, "Master, that is what you yourself say." One acts morally because it is most human, and humane. In Analects 18.6 Confucius reminds us "One cannot herd with birds and beasts. If I am not to be a man among other men, then what am I to be?"

Plato, Aristotle, Jesus, and Confucians answer in a similar way – because the moral act is the most humane thing one can do, it brings one outside oneself to care for others, and it brings joy to the person doing the act. The person following the moral exemplar will experience justification upon doing the right thing, placing himself in the company of the most human.  It is the rite thing to do as well as the right thing to do.

Confucianism teaches that showing compassion and empathy towards others is vital for inner and social moral harmony. Being humane is a precedent for all moral behavior. We can  individually develop into ethical beings. If such behavior becomes socially prevalent, we have the basis for fair and just institutions. One can be compassionate and empathetic even while living among the barbarians. This is no less than the tolerance of the Peace of Babylon promoted in Jeremiah 29:7 and then by Augustine (https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/120119.htm City of God, Book 19, Chapter 26).

What to do with the incorrigible or the mass murderer?

Confucians take their thinking on capital punishment from Buddhists, who deplore killing.

But Confucians are not unalterably opposed to the death penalty. Sam Crane at Useless Tree has an analysis. He first cites Analects 12.19 (Yan Yuan 19) -

Asking Confucius about governing, Lord Chi K'ang said: "What if I secure those who abide in the Way by killing those who ignore the Way - will that work?"
"How can you govern by killing?" replied Confucius. "Just set your heart on what is virtuous and benevolent, and the people will be virtuous and benevolent. The noble-minded have the Integrity of wind, and little people the Integrity of grass. When the wind sweeps over grass, it bends."

There is another passage in the Analects, however, that suggests that Confucius might countenance killing, in cases where some sort of terrible transgression has occurred: Analects 11.17 (Xian Jin 17) -  

The Chi family patriarch had grown wealthier than Duke Chou himself, and still Jan Ch'iu kept gathering taxes for him, adding greatly to his wealth.
The Master said: "He's no follower of mine.  If you sounded the drums and attacked him, my little ones, it wouldn't be such a bad thing."

"Attack" may seem a bit vague here, but Mencius cites this passages and develops the idea further to reach this conclusion in Mencius 4A.14 (Li Lou 14) -

Looking at the subject from this case, we perceive that when a prince was not practicing benevolent government, all his ministers who enriched him were rejected by Confucius - how much more would he have rejected those who are vehement to fight for their prince! When contentions about territory are the ground on which they fight, they slaughter men till the fields are filled with them. When some struggle for a city is the ground on which they fight, they slaughter men till the city is filled with them. This is what is called "leading on the land to devour human flesh." Death is not enough for such a crime. Therefore, those who are skillful to fight should suffer the highest punishment. Next to them should be punished those who unite some princes in leagues against others; and next to them, those who take in grassy commons, imposing the cultivation of the ground on the people.'

It's clear from this that Confucius deplored anyone enriching a ruler who didn't practice Humane government. And he deplored even more those who waged war for such a ruler. In wars for land, the dead crowd the countryside. In wars for cities, the dead fill the cities. This is called helping the land feed on human flesh. Death is not punishment enough for such acts.

And Confucian philosopher Roger T. Ames writes:

The Confucius depicted in the Analects advocated government by moral suasion and example as the core of his political philosophy. This emphasis on education and moral uplifting did not, however, prevent the practical Confucius from assigning penal law a place in his political thought as an unfortunate but necessary backstop for moral education.

Mencius clarifies. All men have the sprouts of virtue, which can be cultivated through education and training so a man becomes virtuous. He uses the barley analogy – barley seeds are the same, but if some seeds develop in poor ground, without sufficient water, they will not grow into healthy plants. Proper circumstances are important for development of virtue, but there is a personal element as well. Mencius Mencius 6A.15 (Gaozi 15 - also Gongduzi 15) -

Gongduzi asked, “We are all equally men, yet some are great men and others small men. Why is this?”

Mencius said, “Those who follow their greater body become great men, those who follow their lesser body become small men.”

“We are all equally men, why do some follow their greater bodies while others follow their smaller?”

Mencius said, “The ears and eyes are organs that do not think; their perception is veiled by things. In this way, one thing encountering another, there is simply a force of attraction. The mind is an organ that thinks. If you think you’ll grasp, if you don’t you won’t. This is a potential endowed in us by Tian. Once a man chooses to stand by his greater parts, his lesser parts cannot seize him. Being a great man is no more than this.”

When the sprouts are planted in infertile soil, or do not get sufficient nutrients, they will not develop into virtues. The first instinct for Confucians will always be education and penitence  rather than revenge. But there may be limits to tolerance and the value of education.

People also make choices, to abide in the Dao or not, regardless of their personal circumstances. This comports with a Christian view. There is free will.

For Christians, free will may need a push, or some support. Augustine says people cannot simply make the choice to do good and avoid evil themselves, as Mencius implies. The difference with Mencius is that Augustine sees the need for faith in order to do good and avoid evil. People do evil when they attempt to be God-like, or ignore morality for the sake of free will.

Chinese religion and Confucian scholar Bryan Van Norden sees the requirement of faith as a barrier to compatibility of the virtue ethics in Christianity and Confucianism. I know some Christians who would think similarly. In my retail, everyday thinking about compatibility, though, the faith objection seems too pedantic. I don’t see how lack of faith makes good actions less meaningful to those receiving them; nor do I see how the presence of faith will necessarily promote better behavior.

Bryan W. Van Norden. Mencius and Augustine on Evil: A Test Case for Comparative Philosophy. Two Roads to Wisdom, 2001. Available at https://www.academia.edu/12843566/Mencius_and_Augustine_on_Evil

A loving response or a humane response to incorrigibility or inhuman acts is a tough standard. We acknowledge that morality for a ruler is different than morality for an individual (Machiavelli). Governments have to think about social harmony as well as justice. Even acknowledging a community standard, I fail to see how killing an individual is a necessary response to evil. But most certainly simple removal from society – while treating in a humane manner – offers a socially responsible solution to killing and other inhuman acts. Confucians and Buddhists would accept such a solution. We have an obligation to be human, and humane, not unlike the protagonist in the Good Samaritan story. Mencius in the famous ‘child falling into a well’ story at Mencius 1A.6 (Gong Sun Chou I.6) -

From this case we may perceive that the feeling of commiseration is essential to man, that the feeling of shame and dislike is essential to man, that the feeling of modesty and complaisance is essential to man, and that the feeling of approving and disapproving is essential to man. The feeling of commiseration is the principle of benevolence. The feeling of shame and dislike is the principle of righteousness. The feeling of modesty and complaisance is the principle of propriety. The feeling of approving and disapproving is the principle of knowledge. Men have these four principles just as they have their four limbs.

To act disregarding these principles is to be not fully human. Democratic  government must respect these principles in acting as moral exemplar for all its citizens. Aristotle and the American founders told us that, too.

Next: http://chinareflections.com/index.php/81-sections-from-book-comments-encouraged/492-confucianism-freedom-and-democracy-2-0-is-confucianism-a-religion-vii-is-confucianism-a-religion